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SCADA General Audit Questions

Posted by :Derek On : November 5, 2009

Category: SCADA

Tags:access, account, authentication, bar, Card, Communications, Corporate, development, disaster recovery, encryption, environment, interface, ISP, Mall, network, operating systems, password, patch, Protection, SCADA, security, SLA, standards, support, technique

General Questions

How can users gain access to the SCADA application?
Objective to consolidate access to all information sources â€“ i.e. to make access available to all users via a single interface
Are any RAS modems utilised within the SCADA environment?
Is the RAS call back feature utilised?
Is the mandatory RAS encryption feature used?
Are users allowed multiple attempts at authentication on the RAS?
Has the RAS auditing feature been enabled?
How is access between the business / corporate network and SCADA network controlled?
How is the administrator password controlled?
How is vendor access to the SCADA network controlled â€“ i.e. password changes after contract has been completed?
Are SLAâ€™s for outsourced support agreements reviewed on a periodic basis?
Are critical components of the SCADA Network supported by a UPS and are these batteries tested on a regular basis to ensure that they are reliable?
What capacity management and monitoring of critical SCADA network systems is performed (i.e. CPU utilisation and hard disk drive space)?
Are legal captions utilised during the login process to the SCADA application and associated infrastructure / devices?
Has an intrusion detection system (IDS) been deployed within the SCADA environment?
Has security been a focus within the development and deployment of the SCADA network?
Is there additional staff screenings performed when staff are hired to work within the SCADA environment (inclusive of vendors etc)?

Policies & Procedures

Is there a defined security strategy for the SCADA environment?
Who is responsible / accountable for security management within SCADA environment? Has the ownership of this responsibility been clearly defined and/or stated in any documentation?
Are there any periodic security reviews of the SCADA network performed?
What procedures are in place to handle the disposal of SCADA network media and devices? Additionally, is there a process in place for the disposal of confidential information / documentation?
Are there any policies or procedures covering the introduction of new devices to the SCADA environment?
What formal change control procedures exist for the SCADA environment?
Does a formal disaster recovery plan exist for the SCADA environment?
Does a formal business continuity plan exist for the SCADA environment?
Do physical and logical security standards differ significantly between SCADA sites?
Has a standard operating environment (SOE) minimum baseline standard been developed for systems being introduced into the SCADA environment?
What security logs are maintained for critical computer equipment and how often are the logs reviewed?
Who is responsible for the reviewing of security logs?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
Upon commencement of employment, are users provided with IT security information as part of the induction process? Additionally, are users provided with further information on security issues on a periodic basis?
What procedures exist to monitor dial-in access?
Is there a formally defined backup and recovery procedure?
Are encryption techniques and/or passwords applied to backup tapes?

Physical Access

How is physical access to SCADA terminals controlled?
Are SCADA control rooms segregated from other rooms?
What building security exists at remote sites to prevent unauthorised access?
What authentication methods are used at remote sites to allow access â€“ i.e. swipe cards?
Are external windows at remotes sites barred?
What alarm systems have been employed at remote sites?

Network Security

Have all deployed routers been configured to ensure the filtering of communications that are unauthorised or not required?
What traffic control and monitoring capabilities have been deployed â€“ i.e. all communication travels to a central point before traversing further on the network.
How are dial-in facilities to the SCADA environment secured?
How is suspicious or unusual activity on the SCADA WAN detected?
What firewall configurations have been set up to segregate the SCADA WAN from the United Water corporate network?
Are all key filtering devices on the network (such as routers and firewalls) configured to log all attempts to access the network? If so are they reviewed on a regular basis?
Have the auditing features of all routers and firewalls been enabled?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
How is the management of patches / hot fixes controlled in regards to firewalls and routers?
What backup and recovery measures are in place for network resources â€“ firewalls and routers?
Has SNMP been implemented on core infrastructure?
Has any wireless equipment been deployed within the SCADA environment â€“ has this been configured to a secure state?
Are all default passwords removed from SCADA devices after implementation?
Does a development environment exist to test changes prior to deployment into the SCADA network production environment?

Workstation Security

What operating systems (version) are installed on SCADA terminals?
Have operating system level passwords been activated on all SCADA terminals?
Do passwords have an indefinite expiry date?
What file and directory permission controls have been implemented on SCADA terminals to restrict unauthorised access by general users?
What logs are generated at the operating system level?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
What tools and services at the operating system level have been restricted for general users?
Who is responsible for patch management of SCADA terminals?
Has an audit feature been enabled for all SCADA terminals?
Are default services available with the operating system restricted?
Is virus protection implemented? Is this software manually or automatically updated?
Are shares enabled on SCADA terminals / workstations?
Are SCADA terminals backed up on a regular basis?
Is registry auditing of SCADA terminals performed?
Are user reviews and associated access rights performed on a regular basis?

SCADA Application Security

What are the username and password requirements of SCADA application?
Are session time out features activated?
Are complex passwords enforced to access the SCADA application?
Are user reviews and associated access rights performed on a regular basis?

System Penetration Testing

Internal penetration testing
External penetration testing
Password strength tests

Changes to the SCADA network

Please provide / list all potential changes being considered to the SCADA network.

Internet Banking Security Assessment Considerations

Posted by :Derek On : August 5, 2008

I was asked some time ago to provide a list of things which may be considered when looking at Internet Banking.

Below is the list. It was just a brain dump and as such may not be complete.

Don’t underestimate the value of standards for your infrastructure, website configuration, database engine configuration/architecture,staging environment and development/QA environments.

Some thoughts:

Many don’t lock accounts after X failed logins, this is normally done for good customer service, but leaves the system vulnerable.

– And all the other things expected for a remote login session (forced password changes, aging, etc))
– Tools such as Brutus may be use to brute force hack authenticated sessions.

Many allow session sequence numbers to be incremented, allowing an authenticated user to view other customer session.

– These may be server side, client side, cookie based, etc.
– Get someone to check the development methodologies and the code being used.
– Database query strings can be placed into test entry fields, allowing table dumps to browser.
– Check all pages served are secure and contain user authentication flags.

Customer data may not be segregated, this needs to be checked.
Customer data should not reside on the Web Server.

Authentication databases / system data should not reside on the webserver.
The databases should reside on a private/semi-private network.

– A different segment to the main banking system.

Webserver should be dual homed or equivalent (some VLAN techniques are good)

– Separate private and public network cards, monitoring/backup/administration
– Infrastructure set-up to explicitly deny inbound/outbound ports, private IP & monitoring escaping from the network.

At all data segregation points ensure rules are in place which appreciates the traffic though that point.

All customer data where possible should be sourced from a secure back-end database.

– This may be a staging environment. i.e. no the main banking system.
– This usually allows for transactions to appear real time to the customer.
– Many transactions may be batched in reality. (internal or external to the bank)

Ensure suitable rules have been set-up on firewalls.

– There should be inbound and outbound rules on firewalls and filtering routers.

Don’t allow any infrastructure on the front end to allow remote administrative connections. (telnet, etc.)

– Use the serial console port to connect to a server or back-end terminal server.

Look for the segregation / staging of online customer content from main banking systems

Ensure that a separate development / QA / production environment system and suitable process is in place.

Services not used by the system are active

– These should be disabled.

Port scan of the supporting infrastructure (routers /switches) and server(s).

– Investigate the reasons for all open ports.

Don’t use the main gateway for trusted partner access (clearing / RAS / etc.)
Do all that standard IIS checks and NT checks (Sample scripts, change management, patching methodologies, etc.)
Ensure denial of service precaution have been taken into account for all infrastructure and server equipment.
Check the adequacy of the escalation procedures used.

– Look for real-time monitoring and alerting.
– Look for responsibility matrix.
– Look for ownership of issues.

Consider upstream carrier(s) vulnerability (denial of service, IP spoofing, DNS hacking, etc)
Consider social engineering of customer, administrative, partner accounts / systems / infrastructure.

– Helpdesk procedures and policies and/or alternate technologies (Caller ID, Gateway IP, etc.).

Use dynamic passwords where possible (SecureID, TACACS, etc.).
Use encrypted tunnelling where needed (IPSec, Firewall 1, etc)
Consider looking at other customer authentication methods to enhance existing methods.

– Digital cert, IP address locked to account, etc.
– Consider use of CVV or CVN for bank issued cards.

Consider how passwords are distributed /changed for customers.

– Plain text email, telephone, etc.
– Can passwords be changed online?

Is additional authentication used between sections of the services once authenticated?
Consider what the customer has access to once authenticated.

– Look at SWIFT, RTGS, inter-bank transfers, access to credit cards, etc.
– If an attacker does get in, what can the do?

Use techniques to ensure pages, customer details are not cached at ISP, or client system.

– These are flags that can be set within pages.
– Normally SSL is cached, but some proxy vendors have been playing with techniques to do so.
– Caching of SSL pages on the client system can be turned on on some browsers.
– May banks use a Java (or similar) applet for all customer interaction, restricting all caching issues.

Ensure paper based and on-line liability clauses are available are address all effected areas.
Ensure within the customer sign-up process banking liability is reduced.

– I’ve seen statements like “use this system at your own risk, responsibility for any liability or claim will NOT……”
– Not very customer focused, but that’s what their legal department recommended.

All of the above can effect the security and/or operation of an on-line banking system.

Other things to consider:

External development and support of the application.
Ownership and management of the hardware/applications
Publishing points for new content (internal/private/trusted network or Internet)
Topology of front end.Â i.e. Security Architecture document should be in place and managed appropriately.
Are limited AP tests performed whenever changes are made to the environment? i.e. integrated AP into Change management process.
Database access. Is it buffered or is it live to the core banking systems.
What facilities are provided? Direct debit + Credit Card + SWIFT + ……. Consider different scenarios for your attack depending on the feature.
What other services are shared within the network segment that the Internet Banking service is running. Can this be used to compromise the Internet Banking site. eg. different support/business/development organisations with differing security strategies/profiles.
Consider all external supporting services within you AP. Look at internal/external DNS poisoning opportunities, mail relay, etc. What IPS’s do they use has the ISP any opportunity to access systems or supporting services which may affect Internet Banking.
Depending on the size of the Bank, many organisation do not use the same support groups for infrastructure and the application. As a result external connections to the infrastructure may be provided for an external support organisation to administer the infrastructure.
Look at the business and user authentication methods and paths (client side certs, secure ID, SMART Card, etc). Consider two factor authentication and modern user identification methods. eg. what is your favourite food in addition to normal usernames and passwords. Do system administration staff use dynamic passwords (secureID, etc)?
See if the Internet Banking application sends email to users which may contain interesting information.
Better access to the application can generally be gained after access to the system. i.e. get an legitimate account on the system. I have found that some sample/administration screens have been restricted to authenticated users only.
Consider social engineering the Help desk to have an account password reset.

Mobile Banking Security and Risk Assessment Considerations

Posted by :Derek On : August 5, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Phones & VoIP, Radio General, Security

Tags:access, account, attack, bank, Banking, Banking and EFTPoS, Card, Credit, data, DUKPT, encapsulation, encryption, hack, identification, Injection, intelligent device, ipsec, JAVA, key logging, mobile banking, Pin, security, server, Shiraz, SMS, sql injection, standards, support, technique, technology, transaction, transmission, type

When considering Mobile Banking security and the associated risks, an assessment approach depends greatly on the solution being created or provided.
Generally the approach is based on layered standards, supporting and surrounding the technologies and techniques used.

Here are some things to consider.

Security assessments generally focuses on two main things.

1/ Sensitivity of the data
What is being sent. eg. Pin, credit card numbers, account balance, home address, bank account number, etc.
Data may not be sensitive to the bank, but may be considered by the client as sensitive.
etc……….

2/ Opportunity to access the data.
What medium is being used?
Is it technology/technique easy or trivial to hack?
What encryption is being used?
Are all data paths secure (client and back end)?
Is there a 3rd party involved in the switching of the transactions?
etc………

Things to consider:

Pin resets sent via SMS to client, should not be used as the only method of accessing accounts. An additional client specific (possibly static) pass word/phrase should be used in addition to a dynamically generated pin. SMS can be sniffed (depending on mode and location).
If WAP is used, are all devices capable of encryption? If devices are not capable of encryption, do we deny access to these devices? If client side JAVA or intelligent device (win CE, etc), ensure this can not be compromised by a Trojan’s and other key logging techniques.
Has the organisation considered client side certificates to verify the device prior to transactions being accepted? Consider multiple device and user identification methods (very solution dependant).
Most mobile POS terminals encrypt the client entered Pin number, but do not encrypt everything within the transaction. If the transmission medium is compromised, we should consider if the encryption can be cracked and if unencrypted data is sensitive. Consider additional data encryption encapsulation i.e. use of all of message encryption (SSL, IPSEC) or use a terminal that utilises Derived Unique Key Per Transaction (DUKPT).
Many banking applications have been affected by typical hacks such as session hijacking, SQL injection, non random session keys (client side and server side), etc… These typical hacks should be considered in your Secure SDLC and QA Processes once you are aware of the technology used and/or deployed.
PBX systems and cabling distribution frames can have devices connected to collect transactions. Wireless devices are now being connected to these systems. The attacker sits in their car in the car park outside. This is often done in super markets.
Wireless transaction gateways if not encrypted are easily collected by anyone within wireless range. 802.11 and other wireless/infra-red mediums are being used (assess the technology and medium being used).
Has the organisation considered dynamic keys for mobile users? There are some very low cost SecureID type solutions available today, but customers need to have these devices on them when they want to do a transaction.

E-Commerce Glossary

Posted by :Derek On : June 18, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Security

Tags:access, account, acquirer, Australia, authenticate, bank, Banking, Banking and EFTPoS, bar, Card, card verification, Commerce, common gateway interface, Corporate, Credit, data, Debit, DES, Digital, Dust, EFT, Electronic, encryption, Explorer, financial institution, financial transaction, IEC, integration, interface, Internet, ISP, Mall, Merchant, Microsoft, money, network, online, password, payment, payment gateways, Pin, privacy, processing, Protection, reporting, script, security, server, Shiraz, SLA, something, support, Telstra, text, transaction, transmission, type, Verification, verification data, VISA, web

Acquiring Institution
The Financial Institution which holds the Merchant Account partaking in a financial transaction, typically the first bank involved in the processing of a payment.

Applet
A small computer program which facilitates the performance of particular tasks.

Bandwidth
The capacity of a server to carry or process information. The higher the bandwidth the faster graphics-laden web pages will download.

Browser
Short for Web browser, a software application used to locate and display Web pages. The two most popular browsers are Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer. Both of these are graphical browsers, which means that they can display graphics as well as text. In addition, most modern browsers can present multimedia information, including sound and video, though they require plug-ins for some formats.

Caching
The automatic copying and storage of frequently used information onto a computer system “ Typically caching is seen whilst surfing the internet (graphics, etc.) and used by Internet Services Providers (ISP’s) to reduce the amount of data requested from the user onto the internet.

Issuer
The Financial Institution which issued the cardholder’s account and card.

Cardholder
The individual participating in the financial transaction whose card is being credited or debited.

Card Verification Data
The additional information printed on the card to be processed. This is used to verify if the card was present when the transaction was initiated.Â This is the additional digits imprinted on the card usually on the reverse side for VISA & Mastercard and on the front for AMEX.

Certificate
An x.509 certificate used to authenticate entities such as Merchants and Payment Gateways. Certificates can be used to identify and/or encrypt sensitive data such as card numbers and personal cardholder information.

CGI
Common Gateway Interface: A protocol that allows a Web page to run a program on a Web server. Forms, counters, and guest books are common examples of CGI programs.

Any piece of software can be a CGI program if it handles input and output according to the CGI standard. Usually a CGI program is a small program that takes data from a web server and does something with it, like putting the content of a form into an e-mail message, or turning the data into a database query. CGI “scripts” are just scripts which use CGI. CGI is often confused with Perl, which is a programming language, while CGI is an interface to the server from a particular program.

Client
A computer or software that requests a service of another computer system or process (a “server”). For example, a workstation requesting the contents of a file from a file server is a client of the file server. A web browser is commonly referred to as a client.

Clients and Servers
In general, all of the machines on the Internet can be categorised as two types: servers and clients. Those machines that provide services (like Web servers or FTP servers) to other machines are servers. And the machines that are used to connect to those services are clients.

When you connect to Yahoo at www.google.com to read a page, Google is providing a machine (probably a cluster of very large machines), for use on the Internet, to service your request. Google is providing a server. Your machine, on the other hand, is probably providing no services to anyone else on the Internet. Therefore, it is a user machine, also known as a client. It is possible and common for a machine to be both a server and a client !

Cookie
A file sent by some web servers to your computer’s hard drive to enable you to quickly and easily return to particular sites. Cookies give rise to privacy concerns as they are often used to store information used for marketing purposes.

The main purpose of cookies is to identify users and possibly prepare customised Web pages for them. When you enter a Web site using cookies, you may be asked to fill out a form providing such information as your name and interests. This information is packaged into a cookie and sent to your Web browser which stores it for later use. The next time you go to the same Web site, your browser will send the cookie to the Web server. The server can use this information to present you with custom Web pages. So, for example, instead of seeing just a generic welcome page you might see a welcome page with your name on it.

CRN
The Customer Receipt Number (CRN) is used to assist the card holder, the payment gateway and the transaction acquirer to confirm the transaction has been processed and to track the transaction throughout the end-to-end transaction process. This is often used when making enquiries about a transaction or for transaction tracking.

Cybersquatting
Bad faith, abusive domain name registration. Cybersquatters register company and product names as domain names with a view to selling them at inflated prices to the rightful owners.

CVC
The additional information printed on the card to be processed. This is used to verify if the card was present when the transaction was initiated. This is the additional digits imprinted on the card usually on the reverse side for VISA & Mastercard and on the front for AMEX.

Database
A collection of data: part numbers, product codes, customer information, etc. It usually refers to data organised and stored on a computer that can be searched and retrieved by a computer program.

Deep link
A hypertext link directly to a web page, often bypassing home pages or other identifying pages.

Digital Certificate
A pop up window that allows you to identify the level of encryption used to secure a particular web site.

Digital Signature
A complex numeric “signature” designed to be used, in conjunction with special software, to authenticate the sender of a message and guarantee that the contents of the message have not been altered during transmission to the recipient. The EU has adopted legislation which makes electronic signatures legally valid. The Electronic Transaction Bill (Cth) 1999 has the same effect in Australia.

Domain Name
The plain English name given to a host destination on the Internet, for example, www.madrock.net. The suffix, dot.com is known as the generic top level domain, the prefix madrock. The domain name forms part of the Internet Address or URL.

A name that identifies one or more IP addresses. For example, the domain name microsoft.com represents about a dozen IP addresses. Domain names are used in URLs to identify particular Web pages. For example, in the URL http://www.madrock.net, the domain name is madrock.net.

Download
To transfer information from one computer to your computer.

Dynamic web page
A web document that is created from a database in real-time or “on the fly” at the same time it is being viewed, providing a continuous flow of new information and giving visitors a new experience each time they visit the web site.

Dynamic web sites offer the user the ability to interact with the web site. This interaction can take place in the form of a search for products, a questionnaire that automatically posts results or online polls. Basically, dynamic web pages and content are generated from the input of the user.

EC
Electronic Commerce.

Often referred to as simply e-commerce, business that is conducted over the Internet using any of the applications that rely on the Internet, such as e-mail, instant messaging, shopping carts, Web services, and FTP, among others. Electronic commerce can be between two businesses transmitting funds, goods, services and/or data or between a business and a customer.

ECI
The Electronic Commerce Indicator (ECI), is used to determine the source of the original transaction request. This is a program that the banks have developed and have mandated itâ€™s use.

Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Systems set up by businesses, which facilitate the electronic exchange of information.

Encryption
The process of scrambling data to prevent it being viewed by unauthorized persons.

Expiry Date
The date printed on the card indicating when the card will expire. Not to be confused with the card issue date found on some cards.

Firewall
An electronic security barrier and/or traffic filter.

Forms
Forms are web pages comprised of text and “fields” for a user to fill in with information. They are an excellent way of collecting and processing information from people visiting a web site, as well as allowing them to interact with web pages. Forms are written in HTML and processed by CGI programs.

Frame
A means of dividing a web screen into a number of compartments. Frames may give rise to legal disputes if web sites created by third parties are framed as your own.

FTP servers
One of the oldest of the Internet services, File Transfer Protocol makes it possible to move one or more files securely between computers while providing file security and organisation as well as transfer control.

Fulfilment
1. Process of supplying goods after an order has been received.
2. Process of reacting to a customer’s request, covering everything that has to happen from the time the customer places an order until they are completely satisfied.

Host
Any computer on a network that provides services or information to other computers on the network. A host is also called a server.

Integration
The software and/or business processes which combine the Merchant’s (website, back office, etc.) order processing system with the EFT Network Electronic Payment System.

IP address
Every computer connected to the Internet is assigned a unique number known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address. Since these numbers are usually assigned in country-based blocks, an IP address can often be used to identify the country from which a computer is connecting to the Internet.

Gateway
A system allowing incompatible computer networks to send and receive information.

HTML (Hypertext Markup Language)
Language used to translate text documents into a form which can be sent over the web.

Hyperlink
A highlighted phrase in a document which permits linking to another document or part of a document.

Internet Content Host (ICH)
Those who host or propose to host content on the Internet. Anybody who is responsible for a web site, news group or bulletin board that contains articles, graphics or other internet content provided by others. The host may/may not also produce their own content and/or provide access to the Internet through a carriage service, ie they may also be an ISP.

Internet Service Provider (ISP)
A company that provides an Internet connection through some kind of Internet carriage service, for example Sprint, Chello Broadband, Telstra Bigpond, Adam Internet, Internode. ISP’s may/may not also be ICHs.

Mail servers
Almost as ubiquitous and crucial as Web servers, mail servers move and store mail over corporate networks (via LANs and WANs) and across the Internet.

Merchant account
This is an account set up with a bank to process credit card orders from customers.

Merchant
The entity receiving payments for goods and/or services.

Merchant Account
The merchant’s account into which transactions are credited or debited.

Merchant Server
The software installed on the Merchant’s web sites or back office system to enable real-time or batched processing of financial transactions.

Merchant Server Administrator
The individual(s) responsible for the maintenance of the Merchant Server, including issuing and importing merchant certificates.

MTL
Merchant Transaction Layer (MTL)

PAN
Primary Account Number (PAN) is the number printed on the customers card to reference the cardholder’s financial account. This is typically the card number.

Payment Gateway
The Payment Gateway provides a central point of contact/transaction switching with the banking network for the Merchant Server software or devices. The EFT Networks Payment gateway provides advanced integrated reporting, merchant integration services (Mainframe, Mini, Windows, UNIX, OS400, Desktop/Server, EFT PoS Terminals. Loyalty systems, etc.) and Merchant/Bank customised solutions not offered by regional or global banking institutions.

An online system for real-time charging of credit cards when a customer places an order. Normally requires a merchant account.

A common question from merchants is “Do we have to change banks to use payment gateways?”

The answer is NO!Â – All you need to do is open a merchant facility with one of the supported banks, EFT Networks can ensure you open the correct one for your transaction needs. The merchant facility is then linked to a nominated bank account for example: Bank of New Zealand, ANZ, St George Bank, NAB, Commonwealth, Westpac, Bank of America, Bank of Scotland, Barclay’s, Bank of Queensland, etc. The money is then transferred at the end of each day from your merchant account to your nominated account.

“Pretty Good Privacy”
A type of encryption program used to scramble data.

Portal
A site that gathers together many sites under a common branding, for example, Yahoo and Excite.

Private key
The password which permits information to be decoded in a public key encryption system.

Public key
The password which is used to send a secure message in a public key encryption system.

Secure Certificate
A document that is used to certify that a user or organisation is who they say they are. They contain information about who it belongs to, who it was issued by, expiry date and information that can be used to check out the contents of the certificate. It is as an important part of the SSL system for establishing secure connections.

Server
A computer that provides a service to other computers (known as clients) on a network.

Shopping cart
A shopping cart is a piece of software that acts as an online store’s catalogue and ordering process. Typically, a shopping cart is the interface between a company’s Web site and its deeper infrastructure, allowing consumers to select merchandise; review what they have selected; make necessary modifications or additions; and purchase the merchandise.

Shopping carts can be sold as independent pieces of software so companies can integrate them into their own unique online solution, or they can be offered as a feature from a service that will create and host a company’s e-commerce site.

Spam
The use of email or newsgroups to send unsolicited information.

SSL
Short for Secure Sockets Layer, a protocol developed by Netscape for transmitting private documents via the Internet. SSL works by using a private key to encrypt data that’s transferred over the SSL connection. Both Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer support SSL, and many Web sites use the protocol to obtain confidential user information, such as credit card numbers. By convention, URLs that require an SSL connection start with https: instead of http:.

Letting your customers know that you have SSL protection gives your site credibility and may encourage customers to deal with you in confidence.

A security protocol used to protect information – typically used between the cardholder’s web browser and the merchant’s webserver and throughout the transaction processing process. 128bit SSL is typical used as a minimum level within the Payment & Financial industries.

A Secure Server uses an SSL certificate. It is generally a piece of web space that can only be dealt with by using SSL ensuring that data transferred between the web space and the browser is encrypted.

Static web page
In web site terms, static means web pages that are not interactive. Because the web site visitor does not have any control over the information provided, the pages and information do not change with each visit. There is not a two-way communication between the user (client) and the web site (server) in a static page.

Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
An Internet address.

Web page
A specific group of related files on the web, which is usually viewed as a single document.

Web servers
At its core, a Web server serves static content to a Web browser by loading a file from a hard disk and serving it across the network to a user’s Web browser. This entire exchange is mediated by the browser and server talking to each other using HTTP.

Web site
A collection of web pages stored on a file server.

Technobile: Chip and pin may be a wonderful concept, but dont write off humans yet – they are more reliable

Posted by :madrock.net On : March 24, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Security

Tags:account, bank, Banking and EFTPoS, Card, Chip, Credit, Debit, debit card, DES, eavesdropper, Guardian, ISP, money, online, Pin, Radio, Reader, Self-service, Shiraz, technology, transaction

Guardian Technology Pages
28 September 2006
The Guardian

“Your card has been declined.”
“What? No way, there’s plenty of money in that account!”
“I’m sorry, madam, but it’s refusing the transaction.”
“It’s your card reader, that card worked fine in Boots five minutes ago.”
“The card has been declined. Do you have another one?”
The casual eavesdropper might infer that I – the protesting woman in that dialogue – am financially irresponsible, that my credit card is maxed out or my debit card has reached its overdraft limit. In fact, it’s far more likely that the reader on the chip and pin machine is throwing a strop. There is a machine at WH Smith in North End Road, Fulham, that hates my debit card and never accepts it. I’ve given up trying there. But it’s not the only one.
Self-service machines have sprung up everywhere, sprouting card readers and keypads. But watch closely and you will find that more often than not, there is an angry person muttering and swearing at the machine while a queue forms. Watch a little longer and you’ll see that queue evaporate – and reform at the counter in front of a human being.
This happened to me and my partner in France recently when we pulled into a petrol station in Epernay. In our desperation, we pulled up at an empty pump, wondering vaguely why it had no queue while others did.
Why? Because before it would dispense petrol, it wanted a credit card and pin. We fed it mine and I keyed in the number, only for it to be spat out with terrifying admonitions in French about the card being refused. I wiped the strip and tried again. Same reaction, causing a moment’s panic: we’d spent a bit on that card – did my bank think it was stolen? Was it blocked?
So we tried my partner’s card. Same thing. And then the penny dropped that the pumps with the queues were the old-fashioned ones where you fill the car up and then pay at the till. Clearly the locals knew all about these pumps.
Mind you, it was a miracle we got to France at all. When we arrived at the Eurotunnel terminus we joined a queue of cars for the automatic check-in. I am not the most patient of queuers and within a short time I was railing about how slowly it was moving. A man in a bright yellow jacket was buzzing about from car to car. Finally we got to the head of the queue and fed in the card that was used to book the shuttle online.
It didn’t want to know. It spat the card out. We tried again and got as far as tapping in our reservation number. It spat it out again. The chap in the high-visibility jacket buzzed over to us and rolled his eyes, saying: “It’s been playing up all day.” He went into the booth with the card – and then we heard him saying over his radio that the whole system had gone down in protest.
As an idea, the technology is great. In practice, we have a long way to go before we can dispense with human beings who can override systems when good card readers go bad. Kate Bevan

VISA Credit or Debit – The Big Question

Posted by :madrock.net On : October 6, 2007

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Internet, Security

Tags:access, account, Australia, bank, Banking and EFTPoS, Card, Credit, Debit, debit card, DES, Internet, ISP, money, online, payment, phone, Shiraz, transaction, utility, VISA

I have been astounded by the take-up by card holders and the push from the major banks in Australia, for customer to embrace the VISA Debit card instead of the traditional Credit Card.

This, although advantageous to the banks, provides a much higher risk to the card holder, especially if the card is used online or in a location where the card could be skimmed.

The problem and the advantage of the VISA Debit card is that it allows access to your savings account funds via a VISA transaction.

This sounds great in theory, as there is no need to transfer money from your savings account to periodically pay off the credit card.

The problem exists where the VISA debit card is skimmed or stolen and money is withdrawn from the card. These funds are taken directly from the card holder savings account and not credit, therefore this increases the risk to the card holder not being able to pay bills/mortgage/loans/etc.

In the traditional credit world, if the credit card was skimmed or stolen, the dept remains the responsibility and risk of the bank, until the fraudulent transaction is investigated.

With the VISA Debit Card this risk is placed upon the card holder, who is often convinced to get one of these cards through good television marketing, when opening a new account or establishing an off-set loan, with no idea of the associated risks.

I dont like the increased risks associated with these cards not being explained adequately to the card holders so the card holder can make an educated decision as to where he/she uses the card (internet, phone, periodic utility payments, ISP charges, etc.

This risk assumes that the card holder does not rely on credit only to live and does not have any savings to withdraw, but the banks may not give you a debit card anyway if this is the case.

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Technobile: Chip and pin may be a wonderful concept, but dont write off humans yet – they are more reliable

VISA Credit or Debit – The Big Question

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