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SCADA General Audit Questions

Posted by :Derek On : November 5, 2009

Category: SCADA

Tags:access, account, authentication, bar, Card, Communications, Corporate, development, disaster recovery, encryption, environment, interface, ISP, Mall, network, operating systems, password, patch, Protection, SCADA, security, SLA, standards, support, technique

General Questions

How can users gain access to the SCADA application?
Objective to consolidate access to all information sources â€“ i.e. to make access available to all users via a single interface
Are any RAS modems utilised within the SCADA environment?
Is the RAS call back feature utilised?
Is the mandatory RAS encryption feature used?
Are users allowed multiple attempts at authentication on the RAS?
Has the RAS auditing feature been enabled?
How is access between the business / corporate network and SCADA network controlled?
How is the administrator password controlled?
How is vendor access to the SCADA network controlled â€“ i.e. password changes after contract has been completed?
Are SLAâ€™s for outsourced support agreements reviewed on a periodic basis?
Are critical components of the SCADA Network supported by a UPS and are these batteries tested on a regular basis to ensure that they are reliable?
What capacity management and monitoring of critical SCADA network systems is performed (i.e. CPU utilisation and hard disk drive space)?
Are legal captions utilised during the login process to the SCADA application and associated infrastructure / devices?
Has an intrusion detection system (IDS) been deployed within the SCADA environment?
Has security been a focus within the development and deployment of the SCADA network?
Is there additional staff screenings performed when staff are hired to work within the SCADA environment (inclusive of vendors etc)?

Policies & Procedures

Is there a defined security strategy for the SCADA environment?
Who is responsible / accountable for security management within SCADA environment? Has the ownership of this responsibility been clearly defined and/or stated in any documentation?
Are there any periodic security reviews of the SCADA network performed?
What procedures are in place to handle the disposal of SCADA network media and devices? Additionally, is there a process in place for the disposal of confidential information / documentation?
Are there any policies or procedures covering the introduction of new devices to the SCADA environment?
What formal change control procedures exist for the SCADA environment?
Does a formal disaster recovery plan exist for the SCADA environment?
Does a formal business continuity plan exist for the SCADA environment?
Do physical and logical security standards differ significantly between SCADA sites?
Has a standard operating environment (SOE) minimum baseline standard been developed for systems being introduced into the SCADA environment?
What security logs are maintained for critical computer equipment and how often are the logs reviewed?
Who is responsible for the reviewing of security logs?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
Upon commencement of employment, are users provided with IT security information as part of the induction process? Additionally, are users provided with further information on security issues on a periodic basis?
What procedures exist to monitor dial-in access?
Is there a formally defined backup and recovery procedure?
Are encryption techniques and/or passwords applied to backup tapes?

Physical Access

How is physical access to SCADA terminals controlled?
Are SCADA control rooms segregated from other rooms?
What building security exists at remote sites to prevent unauthorised access?
What authentication methods are used at remote sites to allow access â€“ i.e. swipe cards?
Are external windows at remotes sites barred?
What alarm systems have been employed at remote sites?

Network Security

Have all deployed routers been configured to ensure the filtering of communications that are unauthorised or not required?
What traffic control and monitoring capabilities have been deployed â€“ i.e. all communication travels to a central point before traversing further on the network.
How are dial-in facilities to the SCADA environment secured?
How is suspicious or unusual activity on the SCADA WAN detected?
What firewall configurations have been set up to segregate the SCADA WAN from the United Water corporate network?
Are all key filtering devices on the network (such as routers and firewalls) configured to log all attempts to access the network? If so are they reviewed on a regular basis?
Have the auditing features of all routers and firewalls been enabled?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
How is the management of patches / hot fixes controlled in regards to firewalls and routers?
What backup and recovery measures are in place for network resources â€“ firewalls and routers?
Has SNMP been implemented on core infrastructure?
Has any wireless equipment been deployed within the SCADA environment â€“ has this been configured to a secure state?
Are all default passwords removed from SCADA devices after implementation?
Does a development environment exist to test changes prior to deployment into the SCADA network production environment?

Workstation Security

What operating systems (version) are installed on SCADA terminals?
Have operating system level passwords been activated on all SCADA terminals?
Do passwords have an indefinite expiry date?
What file and directory permission controls have been implemented on SCADA terminals to restrict unauthorised access by general users?
What logs are generated at the operating system level?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
What tools and services at the operating system level have been restricted for general users?
Who is responsible for patch management of SCADA terminals?
Has an audit feature been enabled for all SCADA terminals?
Are default services available with the operating system restricted?
Is virus protection implemented? Is this software manually or automatically updated?
Are shares enabled on SCADA terminals / workstations?
Are SCADA terminals backed up on a regular basis?
Is registry auditing of SCADA terminals performed?
Are user reviews and associated access rights performed on a regular basis?

SCADA Application Security

What are the username and password requirements of SCADA application?
Are session time out features activated?
Are complex passwords enforced to access the SCADA application?
Are user reviews and associated access rights performed on a regular basis?

System Penetration Testing

Internal penetration testing
External penetration testing
Password strength tests

Changes to the SCADA network

Please provide / list all potential changes being considered to the SCADA network.

Secure Application Development links

Posted by :Derek On : October 14, 2008

Hi,

I have been putting some secure application development documents together recently and have found some good general tutorials and guidelines which I thought I would post here.

Best Practices

The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Vulnerabilities, 2004 Update, The Open Web Application Security Project. URL: http://www.owasp.org/documentation/topten
A Guide to Building Secure Web Applications, The Open Web Application Security Project. URL: http://www.owasp.org/documentation/guide
Improving Web Application Security: Threats and Countermeasures, Microsoft MSDN. URL: http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/enus/dnnetsec/html/ThreatCounter.asp
Authentication in ASP.NET: .NET Security Guidance, Microsoft MSDN. URL: http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/enus/dnbda/html/authaspdotnet.asp
Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web-Based Applications, ACROS Security. http://www.acros.si/papers/session_fixation.pdf
Writing Secure Code, Michael Howard and David LeBlanc, Microsoft Press.
Threat Modelling, Window Snyder, Microsoft Press.
10 Things You Shouldn’t Do with SQL Server (Data Access Developer “Don’ts”) http://www.dotnetjunkies.ddj.com/Article/86F0988E-FED4-414F-BA2E-D01D953C11BE.dcik
Ten dos and don’ts for secure coding http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid14_gci1172049,00.html
Cross Site Scripting http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/cross_site_scripting.pdf http://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/cross-site-scripting.htm
The Cross Site Scripting (XSS) FAQ http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/xss-faq.shtml
XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Cheat Sheet http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20070315/sql-injection-cheat-sheet/

Other Resources

AusCERT is the national Computer Emergency Response Team for Australia http://www.auscert.org.au/
SANS Institute http://www.sans.org/free_resources.php

Internet Banking Security Assessment Considerations

Posted by :Derek On : August 5, 2008

I was asked some time ago to provide a list of things which may be considered when looking at Internet Banking.

Below is the list. It was just a brain dump and as such may not be complete.

Don’t underestimate the value of standards for your infrastructure, website configuration, database engine configuration/architecture,staging environment and development/QA environments.

Some thoughts:

Many don’t lock accounts after X failed logins, this is normally done for good customer service, but leaves the system vulnerable.

– And all the other things expected for a remote login session (forced password changes, aging, etc))
– Tools such as Brutus may be use to brute force hack authenticated sessions.

Many allow session sequence numbers to be incremented, allowing an authenticated user to view other customer session.

– These may be server side, client side, cookie based, etc.
– Get someone to check the development methodologies and the code being used.
– Database query strings can be placed into test entry fields, allowing table dumps to browser.
– Check all pages served are secure and contain user authentication flags.

Customer data may not be segregated, this needs to be checked.
Customer data should not reside on the Web Server.

Authentication databases / system data should not reside on the webserver.
The databases should reside on a private/semi-private network.

– A different segment to the main banking system.

Webserver should be dual homed or equivalent (some VLAN techniques are good)

– Separate private and public network cards, monitoring/backup/administration
– Infrastructure set-up to explicitly deny inbound/outbound ports, private IP & monitoring escaping from the network.

At all data segregation points ensure rules are in place which appreciates the traffic though that point.

All customer data where possible should be sourced from a secure back-end database.

– This may be a staging environment. i.e. no the main banking system.
– This usually allows for transactions to appear real time to the customer.
– Many transactions may be batched in reality. (internal or external to the bank)

Ensure suitable rules have been set-up on firewalls.

– There should be inbound and outbound rules on firewalls and filtering routers.

Don’t allow any infrastructure on the front end to allow remote administrative connections. (telnet, etc.)

– Use the serial console port to connect to a server or back-end terminal server.

Look for the segregation / staging of online customer content from main banking systems

Ensure that a separate development / QA / production environment system and suitable process is in place.

Services not used by the system are active

– These should be disabled.

Port scan of the supporting infrastructure (routers /switches) and server(s).

– Investigate the reasons for all open ports.

Don’t use the main gateway for trusted partner access (clearing / RAS / etc.)
Do all that standard IIS checks and NT checks (Sample scripts, change management, patching methodologies, etc.)
Ensure denial of service precaution have been taken into account for all infrastructure and server equipment.
Check the adequacy of the escalation procedures used.

– Look for real-time monitoring and alerting.
– Look for responsibility matrix.
– Look for ownership of issues.

Consider upstream carrier(s) vulnerability (denial of service, IP spoofing, DNS hacking, etc)
Consider social engineering of customer, administrative, partner accounts / systems / infrastructure.

– Helpdesk procedures and policies and/or alternate technologies (Caller ID, Gateway IP, etc.).

Use dynamic passwords where possible (SecureID, TACACS, etc.).
Use encrypted tunnelling where needed (IPSec, Firewall 1, etc)
Consider looking at other customer authentication methods to enhance existing methods.

– Digital cert, IP address locked to account, etc.
– Consider use of CVV or CVN for bank issued cards.

Consider how passwords are distributed /changed for customers.

– Plain text email, telephone, etc.
– Can passwords be changed online?

Is additional authentication used between sections of the services once authenticated?
Consider what the customer has access to once authenticated.

– Look at SWIFT, RTGS, inter-bank transfers, access to credit cards, etc.
– If an attacker does get in, what can the do?

Use techniques to ensure pages, customer details are not cached at ISP, or client system.

– These are flags that can be set within pages.
– Normally SSL is cached, but some proxy vendors have been playing with techniques to do so.
– Caching of SSL pages on the client system can be turned on on some browsers.
– May banks use a Java (or similar) applet for all customer interaction, restricting all caching issues.

Ensure paper based and on-line liability clauses are available are address all effected areas.
Ensure within the customer sign-up process banking liability is reduced.

– I’ve seen statements like “use this system at your own risk, responsibility for any liability or claim will NOT……”
– Not very customer focused, but that’s what their legal department recommended.

All of the above can effect the security and/or operation of an on-line banking system.

Other things to consider:

External development and support of the application.
Ownership and management of the hardware/applications
Publishing points for new content (internal/private/trusted network or Internet)
Topology of front end.Â i.e. Security Architecture document should be in place and managed appropriately.
Are limited AP tests performed whenever changes are made to the environment? i.e. integrated AP into Change management process.
Database access. Is it buffered or is it live to the core banking systems.
What facilities are provided? Direct debit + Credit Card + SWIFT + ……. Consider different scenarios for your attack depending on the feature.
What other services are shared within the network segment that the Internet Banking service is running. Can this be used to compromise the Internet Banking site. eg. different support/business/development organisations with differing security strategies/profiles.
Consider all external supporting services within you AP. Look at internal/external DNS poisoning opportunities, mail relay, etc. What IPS’s do they use has the ISP any opportunity to access systems or supporting services which may affect Internet Banking.
Depending on the size of the Bank, many organisation do not use the same support groups for infrastructure and the application. As a result external connections to the infrastructure may be provided for an external support organisation to administer the infrastructure.
Look at the business and user authentication methods and paths (client side certs, secure ID, SMART Card, etc). Consider two factor authentication and modern user identification methods. eg. what is your favourite food in addition to normal usernames and passwords. Do system administration staff use dynamic passwords (secureID, etc)?
See if the Internet Banking application sends email to users which may contain interesting information.
Better access to the application can generally be gained after access to the system. i.e. get an legitimate account on the system. I have found that some sample/administration screens have been restricted to authenticated users only.
Consider social engineering the Help desk to have an account password reset.

Financial Transaction Processing

Posted by :Derek On : July 2, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Infrastructure, Security

Tags:algorithm, architecture, Australia, bank, Banking and EFTPoS, BogoAtalla, Card, card verification, computations, Credit, CVV, data, Debit, debit card, debit cards, decrypt, decryption, decryption tools, DES, development, DUKPT, EFT, emulation, emulator, Eracom, financial transaction, hardware, hardware security, HSM, Linksys, Mall, mechanisms, payment, Pin, pin pad, processing, Protection, PVV, SAP, script, security, security architecture, server, Shiraz, simulation tools, SLA, SMS, technique, text, Thales, transaction, triple des, utility, Verification, VISA

I have been recently working inside one of the larger Banks in Australia.
Through this work, I have been looking at the controls and mechanisms surrounding the processing of credit and debit cards around the Asia Pacific.

I get to perform many security architecture and payment systems assessments.
Over the years I have always considered the protection of the card data as one of the key considerations.

Until yesterday I had never seen an CVV or PVV decryption tools. I think some scripted use of these tools could be very interesting.
The site hziggurat29.com

Many of the other tools on this site are also very unique and worth a look.
Big thanks to ziggurat29 for providing such awesome tools.

As many of these sites are of this nature are difficult to find and often seem to vanish over the years, I have chosen to replicate the the text from this page and provide local copies on the files.
It is worth periodically visiting the ziggurat29 site every now and again to see if any additional tools have been posted.

One of the more extraordinary files is the Atalla Hardware Security Module (HSM) and BogoAtalla for Linksys emulation (simulation) tools. So I wonder if Eracom and Thales are shaking in their boots. Some how I don’t think so. 😉

——– ziggurat29 Text ———

These are all Windows command-line utilities (except where noted); execute with the -help option
to determine usage.

DUKPT Decrypt (<- the actual file to download)

This is a utility that will decrypt Encrypted PIN Blocks that have been produced via the DUKPT triple-DES method. I used this for testing the output of some PIN Pad software I had created, but is also handy for other debugging purposes.

VISA PVV Calculator (<- the actual
file to download)

This is a utility that will compute and verify PIN Verification Values that have been produced using the VISA PVV technique. It has a bunch of auxiliary functions, such as verifying and fixing a PAN (Luhn computations), creating and encrypting PIN blocks, decrypting and extracting PINs from encrypted PIN blocks, etc.

VISA CVV Calculator (<- the actual file to download)

This is a utility that will compute Card Verification Values that have been produced using the VISA CVV technique. MasterCard CVC uses the CVV algorithm, so it will work for that as well. It will compute CVV, CVV2, CVV3, iCVV, CAVV, since these are just variations on service code and the
format of the expiration date. Verification is simply comparing the computed value with what you have received, so there is no explicit verification function.

Atalla AKB Calculator (<- the actual file to download)

This is a utility that will both generate and decrypt Atalla AKB cryptograms. You will need the plaintext MFK to perform these operations. When decrypting, the MAC will also be checked and the results shown.

BogoAtalla (<- the actual file to
download)

This is an Atalla emulator (or simulator). This software emulation (simulation) of the well-known Atalla Hardware Security Module (HSM) that is used by banks and processors for cryptographic operations, such as verifying/translating PIN blocks, authorising transactions by verifying
CVV/CSC numbers, and performing key exchange procedures, was produced for testing purposes. This implementation is not of the complete HP Atalla command set, but rather the just
portions that I myself needed. That being said, it is complete enough if you are performing acquiring and/or issuing processing functions, and are using more modern schemes such as Visa PVV and DUKPT, and need to do generation, verification, and translation.

This runs as a listening socket server and handles the native Atalla command set. I have taken some liberties with the error return values and have not striven for high-fidelity there (i.e., you may get a different error response from native hardware), but definitely should get identical positive
responses. Some features implemented here would normally require purchasing premium commands, but all commands here implemented are available. Examples are generating PVV values and encrypting/decrypting plaintext PIN values.

BogoAtalla for Linksys (<- the actual file to download)

This is the Atalla emulator ported to Linux and build for installation on an OpenWRT system. Makes for a really cheap ($60 USD) development/test device.

Local Files

bogoatalla002
atallaakbcalc
bogoatalla_10-1_mipsel
dukptdecrypt
visacvvcalc
visapvvcalc

Lethal Toxins Entering Your Body

Posted by :Derek On : May 4, 2008

Category: Environment & People, Food & Wine

Tags:Australia, Australian, DES, development, environment, Environment & People, ISP, Kerry, Mall, Material, Pin, Protection, pvc, Restaurant, Shiraz, text, toxins

I recently read an article in a magazine and was shocked to see some of the toxic dangers which modern living introduce. Australian Men’s Health April 2008, by Susan Casey, pg 87.

I thought I would expand on this article here as a method of analysing some of the things Kerry and I need to be careful of. I hope this also assists others in understanding some of these dangers.

“Except for the small amount that’s been incinerated every bit of plastic ever manufactured still exists”

Toxic Articles	Polycarbonate Bottles (marked with a #7 in a triangle)	Cling wrap and plastic takeaway containers (marked with a #7)
Dangerous Ingredients	Bisphenol A (BPA), a synthetic oestrogen, which can leach into the bottle’s contents when heated.span>	Phthalates, a probable human carcinogen and endocrine disruptor, can seep into food (especially fatty foods, such as delis meats and cheeses).
Linked to	Prostate cancer, reduced sperm count and reproductive-organ abnormalities, according to US studies at the universities of Missouri, Chicago and Cincinnati.	Reproductive problems like undescended testes and low sperm count, reveal researchers at New York’s University of Rochester and the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in the US.
How to reduce your exposure	Pots, pans and bottles made from stainless steel are a non-toxic alternative. If you’re using polycarbonate, keep it out of the dishwasher and replace it every 60 days or if it’s scratched. Plastic releases toxins over tie when damaged or exposed to high heat.	Keep it out of microwave and dishwasher. Don’t store fatty or acidic foods in these containers, rather use waxed paper and buy meat wrapped in paper from the butcher. If you use plastic-wrapped cuts, trim the edges off where the product touched the wrapping.

Toxic Articles	Polystyrene cups and takeaway containers (marked with a #6)	Fast-food containers (with waxy lining) and non-stick (Teflon) pans.	Polyvinyl chloride (PVC), used in vinyl flooring, shower curtains and car interiors.
Dangerous Ingredients	Styrene, a possible human carcinogen, can leah into the contents of the cup.	Perfluoro-octanoic acid (PFOA), a grease-repelling flourotelomer chemical and likely human carcinogen, can transfer from the waxy-plastic coating onto the food inside, especially at high temperatures.	Vinyl chloride is a known human carcinogen that gives off gas into the surrounding air, so it’s inhaled instead of ingested.span>
Linked to	Cancer, warn scientists at the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Research and Development and the World Health Organisations International Agency for Research on Cancer.	Cancer, lung and kidney damage, according to studies at the EPA and Environmental Working Group in the US.	Cancer and liver damage, predicts both the EA and the Centre for Health and Environmental Justice in the US.
How to reduce your exposure	Never drink hot liquids out of polystyrene ups. Use paper ones (those without a wax lining) whenever possible or a ceramic coffee mug. If your takeaway comes in polystyrene, transfer it to ceramic dish or glass as soon as possible.	The best alternatives to drive-through and delivery are sit-down restaurants and home cooking. At home, never use Teflon-coated pans. If you own any, replace with non-toxic cookware made from copper, cast iron or stainless steel.	Use natural materials for home flooring. Buy a shower curtain made from hemp, which lasts longer and is naturally mildew-resistant. New vinyl gives off aerial toxins at highly concentrated levels, so open windows to air spaces where this material is present.

These are also great articles:

http://www.seattlepi.com/local/326907_plastic09.html

http://www.bravenewleaf.com/environment/2008/02/updated-repeat.html

http://www.breastcancerfund.org/clear-science/environmental-breast-cancer-links/plastics/

http://io9.com/how-to-recognize-the-plastics-that-are-hazardous-to-you-461587850

http://www.smallfootprintfamily.com/avoiding-toxins-in-plastic

http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/04/11/plastic-use.aspx

ISO 14443 contactless card

Posted by :madrock.net On : March 24, 2008

Category: RFID

Tags:access, bank, Card, Chip, chip card, contactless card, contactless cards, DES, development, Dust, environment, frequency, identity, interface, ISO 14443, iso standards, payment, payment solutions, proximity, public transport services, Radio, radio frequency power, Restaurant, RFID, security, Shiraz, smart card, standards, Technical, technology, transmission

An international standard for proximity or contactless smart card communication

ISO 14443 contactless card

ISO 14443 is an international standard which describes how contactless cards and terminals should work to ensure industry-wide compatibility, for example in identity, security, payment, mass-transit and access control applications.

ISO standards are developed by the ISO, the International Organization for Standardization. Technical committees comprising experts from the industrial, technical and business sectors develop the standards to increase levels of quality, reliability and interoperability on a global scale.

Gemplus has always had a strong involvement in ISO definition of the chip card standards, and has been represented in the development of this international standard. The ISO 14443 is divided into 4 separate parts outlining physical characteristics, radio frequency power and signal interface, initialization and anti-collision and transmission protocol.

Gemplus has developed a wide range of contactless payment solutions based on the ISO 14443 international standard. The speed and convenience of contactless technology has created a significant demand for this sort of solution in environments such as fast food restaurants, gas stations, public transport services, banks and many others.

Bluetooth – Security

Posted by :Derek On : March 24, 2008

Category: Bluetooth, Security

Tags:access, antenna, attack, authentification, Backdoor, bar, best practices, bluejacker, Bluejacking, Bluetooth, broadcast, Card, Commerce, Communications, Corporate, data, DES, development, Digital, Dust, EFT, Electronic, encryption, Enterprise, Ericsson, frequency, hack, Hacking, identity, Internet, JAVA, javascript, Mall, mechanisms, mobile phones, network, online, payment, personal area networks, phone, php, Pin, privacy, Radiation, Radio, script, security, Serious, Shiraz, SLA, SMS, SNARF, something, Technical, technique, technology, threat, Threats, transmission, web

Redirected from Bluetooth

Source

1 Bluetooth
2 Wireless- History
3 Wireless- Technologies
4 Bluetooth- Technical Introduction
5 Bluetooth- Advantages
6 Bluetooth- Applications
7 Bluetooth- Security Issues
7.1 The SNARF attack
7.2 The BACKDOOR attack
7.3 The BLUEBUG attack
7.4 Bluejacking
7.5 Warnibbling
8 Future of Bluetooth
9 See also:
10 Reference List

Bluetooth

Bluetooth is a new technology that utilises radio frequency waves as a way to communicate wirelessly between digital devices. It sets up personal area networks that incorporate all of a persons digital devices into one system for both convergence and convenience.

Wireless- History

Many people put the invention of [wireless] radio down to Guglielmo Marconi, who in 1895 sent the first radio telegraph transmission across the English Channel. Only twelve years later radio began being used in the public sphere. [Mathias, p.2] Up until then however, many wireless pioneers conducted trials across lakes where the antenna used to transmit the signal was longer than the distance across the lake. [Brodsky, p. 3] After its introduction the main use of wireless radio was for military communications where its first use was for the Boer War. [Flichy, p. 103] The invention of broadcast radio ensured the feasibility of wireless technologies. [Morrow, p. 2] By the 1920s, radio had become a well-recognised mass medium. [Flichy, p. 111] From the 1980s until now, wireless communications have been through several stages, from 1G (analogue signal), 2G (digital signal) and 3G (always on, faster data rate). [Lightman and Rojas, p. 3] The history of Bluetooth is a much more recent one, with the first Bluetooth-enabled products coming into existence in 2000. Named after Harald Blatand the first, king of Denmark around twelve hundred years ago, who joined the Danish and Norwegian kingdoms, Bluetooth technology is founded on this same unifying principle of being able to unite the computer and telecommunication industr[ies]. [Ganguli, p. 5] In 1994 the Ericsson Company began looking into the idea of replacing cables connecting accessories to mobile phones and computers with wireless links, and this became the main inspiration behind Bluetooth. [Morrow, p. 10]

Wireless- Technologies

Bluetooth is not the only wireless technology currently being developed and utilised. Other wireless technologies, including 802.11b, otherwise known as Wi-Fi, Infrared Data Association (IrDA), Ultra- Wideband Radio (UWB), and Home RF are being applied to similar technologies that Bluetooth use with mixed results. 802.11 is the most well known technology, excluding Bluetooth, and uses the same radio frequency, meaning that they are not compatible as they cause interference with each other. 802.11 is being implemented into universities in the US, Japan and China, as well as food and beverage shops where they are being used to identify students and customers. Even airports have taken up the 802.11 technology, with airports all over America, and three of Americas most prominent airlines promoting the use of it. [Lightman and Rojas, p. 202-3] Infrared Data Association is extremely inferior to that of Bluetooth. Its limitations include only being able to communicate point-to-point, needing a line of sight, and it has a speed of fifty- six kilobytes per second, whereas Bluetooth is one megabyte per second. [Ganguli, p. 17] The Ultra- Wideband Radio is superior to that of Bluetooth in that it can transmit at greater lengths (up to 70 metres), with only half of the power that Bluetooth uses. [Ganguli, p.17] HomeRF is a technology that is not very well known. It is used for data and voice communication and targeted for the residential market segment and does not serve enterprise- class WLANs, public access systems or fixed wireless Internet access. [Ganguli, p.17-18]

Bluetooth- Technical Introduction

Bluetooth is a short- range radio device that replaces cables with low power radio waves to connect electronic devices, whether they are portable or fixed. The Bluetooth device also uses frequency hopping to ensure a secure, quality link, and it uses ad hoc networks, meaning that it connects peer-to-peer. It can be operated worldwide and without a network because it uses the unlicensed Industrial- Scientific Medical (ISM) band for transmission that varies with a change in location. [Ganguli, p. 25-6] The Bluetooth user has the choice of point-to-point or point-to-multipoint links whereby communication can be held between two devices, or up to eight. [Ganguli, p. 96] When devices are communicating with each other they are known as piconets, and each device is designated as a master unit or slave unit, usually depending on who initiates the connection. However, both devices have the potential to be either a master or a slave. [Swaminatha and Elden, p. 49]

Bluetooth- Advantages

There are many advantages to using Bluetooth wireless technologies including the use of a radio frequency, the inexpensive cost of the device, replacing tedious cable connections, the low power use and implemented security measures. The use of an unlicensed radio frequency ensures that users do not need to gain a license in order to use it. Unlike Infrared which needs to have a line of sight in order to work, Bluetooth radio waves are omnidirectional and do not need a clear path. The device itself is relatively cheap and easy to use, one can be bought for around ten American dollars, and this price is currently decreasing. Compare this to the expensive cost of implementing hundreds of cables and wires into an office and there is no competition. Of course, this is the main reason for the take -up in Bluetooth -enabled devices; it does away with cables. Another of Bluetooths advantages is its low power use, ensuring that battery operated devices such as mobile phones and personal digital assistants wont have their battery life drained with the use of it. This low power consumption also guarantees minimal interruption from other radio operated and wireless devices that operate at a higher power. Bluetooth has several enabled security measures that ensures a level of privacy and security, including frequency hopping, whereby the device changes radio frequency sixteen hundred times per second. Also within the security tools are encryption and authentification mechanisms that guarantee little interference by unauthorised hackers. [Ganguli, p. 330] One of the best advantages of Bluetooth devices, especially the hands free device that connects to a mobile phone, is that it removes radiation from the brain region. [Tsang, p.1]

Bluetooth- Applications

The applications that are in development or current use for the Bluetooth technology include such areas as automotive, medical, industrial equipment, output equipment, digital -still cameras, computers, and communications systems. [Lightman and Rojas, p. 201] Bluetooth is an ad hoc network user, and therefore it may be used for social networking, i.e. people can meet and share files or link their Bluetooth devices together to play games or other such activities. [Smyth, p. 70] Using Bluetooth, a mobile phone can become a three- way phone, where at home it connects to a landline for cheaper calls, on the move it acts as a mobile phone and when it comes in contact with another Bluetooth-enabled phone it acts as a walkie- talkie. This walkie- talkie option allows for free interaction and communication, as Bluetooth is not connected to any telecommunications network. [Gupta, p.1] Bluetooth also allows automatic synchronization of your desktop, mobile computer, notebook and your mobile phone for the user to have all of their data managed as one. [Gupta, p.1]

Bluetooth- Security Issues

Bluetooth has several threats which range in level of risk and how widespread the action is. These threats have the ability to provide criminals with sensitive information on both corporate and personal levels. The only way to avoid such threats is for manufacturers, distributors, and consumers to be provided with more information on how they are committed, current attack activity and how to combat them. This information can be used on a technical level for manufacturers, it can be used by distributors at retail levels to teach consumers the risks and it can be used directly by consumers to be aware of the threats. The outcome of such research will allow end users of Bluetooth products to have an upper hand in this wireless warfare. Bluetooth security is in early stages with regards to both the attackers, their techniques and consumers understanding of these attacks. Some research has been conducted into what the attackers are doing and how they do it. Adam Laurie of A.L Digital Ltd http://www.thebunker.net/release-bluestumbler.htm is leading the research race in Bluetooth security and is often linked to academic resources. Laurie’s research has uncovered the following capabilities of Bluetooth attacks:

Confidential data such as the entire phone book, calender and the phone’s IMEI.
Complete memory contents of some mobile phones can be accessed by a previously trusted (“paired”) device that has since been removed from the trusted list.
Access can be gained to the AT command set of the device, giving full access to the higher level commands and channels, such as data, voice and messaging.

Attacks on Bluetooth devices at this stage are relatively new to consumers, and therefore are not widely seen as a real threat. Attacks such as the Bluejack attack are probably more recognised by consumers due to its perceived humorous and novelty nature as well as the ease to Bluejack someone. Users who allow their phone to be Bluejacked open the door to more serious attacks, such as the Backdoor attack which have a low level of awareness amongst consumers as attackers can attach to the device with out the users knowledge. Corporations are starting to understand the risks Bluetooth devices pose, Michael Ciarochi (in Brewin 2004) stated that ‘Bluetooth radios were included in laptop PCs that were being configured by an IT Engineer. It raises the possibility of opening a wireless back door into data stored on the PCs. Such a security weakness would be extremely attractive to hackers. Although Bluetooth invites hackers to such attacks; Bluetooth Venders are playing down the risks, Brewin (2004) said that ‘Bluetooth advocates last week dismissed growing security fears about the short-range wireless technology, saying any flaws are limited to a few mobile-phone models. They also detailed steps that users can take to secure Bluetooth devices’. There are many methods of Bluetooth attacks, the Snarf, the Backdoor, Bluebug, Bluejack and Warnibbling attack are the only recognised attacks at this early stage. Below are explanations of such attacks.

The SNARF attack

It is possible for attackers to connect to the device without alerting the user, once in the system sensitive data can be retrieved, such as the phone book, business cards, images, messages and voice messages.

http://www.salzburgresearch.at/research/gfx/bluesnarf_cebit2004.pdf

Local Copy: BlueSnarf_CeBIT2004.pdf

The BACKDOOR attack

The backdoor attack is a higher concern for Bluetooth users; it allows attackers to establishing a trust relationship through the “pairing” mechanism, but ensuring that the user can not see the target’s register of paired devices. In doing this attackers have access to all the data on the device, as well as access to use the modem or internet; WAP and GPRS gateways may be accessed without the owner’s knowledge or consent.

The BLUEBUG attack

This attack gives access to the AT command set, in other words it allows the attacker to make premium priced phone calls, allows the use of SMS, or connection the internet. Attackers can not only use the device for such fraudulent exercises it also allows identity theft to impersonate the user.

Bluejacking

Dibble (2004) explained that ‘Just as SMS was spawned, there’s a new craze that’s spreading across parts of Europe. Reportedly, it’s more prominent in the UK, but popular elsewhere too’. Bluejacking allows attackers to send messages to strangers in public via Bluetooth. When the phones ‘pair’ the attacked can write a message to the user. Although it may seem harmless at first, there is a downside. Once connected the attacker may then have access to any data on the users Bluetooth device, which has obvious concerns. Powell (2004: 22) explained that ‘Users can refuse any incoming message or data, so Bluejackers change their username to a short barb or compliment to beat you to the punch. For example, you might receive something along the lines of “Incoming message from: Dude, you’ve been Bluejacked.” Or, “Incoming message from: ROI is overrated.” Bluejacking is regarded as a smaller threat to Bluetooth as users being attacked are aware they have been Bluejacked. This does not mean however that they are aware that sensitive information is being accessed and used in a malicious manner.

http://www.bluejackq.com/

Warnibbling

Warnibbling is a hacking technique using Redfang, or similar software that allows hackers to reveal corporate or personal sensitive information. Redfang allows hackers to find Bluetooth devices in the area, once found, the software takes you through the process of accessing any data that is stored on that device. Redfang also allows non-discoverable devices to be found. Whitehouse explains when testing Redfang ‘One of the first obstacles we had to overcome was the discovery of non-discoverable devices (it was surprising to see the number of devices that dont by default implement this security measure)’. http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/acrobat/atstake_war_nibbling.pdf

Future of Bluetooth

Further information, and somewhat speculation is required for consumers and Bluetooth stakeholders on the future of Bluetooth. Such information will provide a clearer understanding of why security of Bluetooth must be improved. Luo and Lee (2004) provide a short term prediction of where Bluetooth is heading, Europe and Asian countries already offer electronic newspapers, subway tickets, and car parking fees via wireless devices. Collins (2003) says that Bluetooth devices ‘appear to be more secure than 802.11 wireless LANs. However, this situation may not last, as the Bluetooth technology becomes more widespread and attracts greater interest from the hacking community’.

http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jibc/0402-10.htm

Reference List

Brodsky, I. (1995) Wireless: The Revolution in Personal Telecommunications, Massachussetts, USA: Artech House Inc, ISBN 0890067171 (Erin Watson)
Collins, G. (2003) Bluetooth Security. Byte.com [Online], Available: Academic Search Elite, ISSN:0360-5280 [Accessed 6/9/04]. (Ben Henzell)
Dibble, T (2003) ‘Bluejack city: a new wireless craze is spreading through Europe’ [Online]. Available: http://www.sys-con.com/Wireless/article.cfm?id=710 [Accessed 4/8/04. (Ben Henzell)
Finn, E. (2004) Be carefull when you cut the cord. Popular Science [Online], vol. 264, issue. 5, p30. Available: Ebsco Host: Academic Search Elite, ISSN:0161-7370 [Accessed 6/9/04]. (Ben Henzell)
Flichy, P. (1995) Dynamics of Modern Communication, London: Sage Publications, ISBN 0803978502 (Erin Watson)
Ganguli, M. (2002) Getting Started with Bluetooth, Ohio: Premier Press, ISBN 1931841837 (Erin Watson)
Gupta, P. 1999. Bluetooth Technology: What are the Applications?. http://www.mobileinfo.com/Bluetooth/applic.htm (accessed August 23, 2004). (Erin Watson)
Laurie, B & L (2003) Serious flaws in Bluetooth security lead to disclosure of personal data [Online]. Available: http://www.thebunker.net/release-bluestumbler.htm [Accessed 4th Aug 2004]. (Ben Henzell)
Lightman, A. and Rojas, W. (2002) Brave New Unwired World, New York, USA: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., ISBN 0471441104 (Erin Watson)
Luo, X. Lee, C. (2004). Micropayments in Wireless M-Commerce: Issues, Security, and Trend[Online]. Available: http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jibc/0402-10.htm [Accessed 4/8/2004] (Ben Henzell)
Morrow, R. (2002) Bluetooth Operation and Use, New York, USA: The McGraw- Hill Companies, ISBN 007138779X (Erin Watson)
Powell, W. (2004) The Wild Wild Web T+D [Online], Vol. 58, issue. 1, p22. Available: Academic Search Elite, ISSN:1535-7740 [Accessed 6/9/04]. (Ben Henzell)
Smyth, P. (ed.)(2004) Mobile and Wireless Communications: Key Technologies and Future Applications, London, UK: The Institute of Electrical Engineers, ISBN 0863413684 (Erin Watson)
Swaminatha, T. and Elden, C. (2003) Wireless Security and Privacy: Best Practices and Design Techniques, Massachussetts, USA: Pearson Education, Inc., ISBN 0201760347 (Erin Watson)
Tsang, W. et al. Date unknown. Bluetooth Applications. http://ntrg.cs.tcd.ie/undergrad/4ba2.01/group3/applications.html (accessed August 23, 2004). (Erin Watson)
Whitehouse, O. (2003).’War Nibbling: Bluetooth Insecurity’ [Online]. Available: http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/acrobat/atstake_war_nibbling.pdf [Accessed 9/8/04] (Ben Henzell)

Erin Watson 08:47, 8 Sep 2004 (EST) â€“nhenzell 12:30, 8 Sep 2004 (EST)

What changes to contactless standards and technology are expected in the future?

Posted by :Derek On : March 24, 2008

Category: RFID

Tags:access, authenticate, Card, Chip, contactless card, contactless cards, contactless technologies, data, DES, development, frequency, IEC, ISO/IEC 14443, ISO/IEC 15693, network, Pin, Reader, RFID, security, Shiraz, standards, support, technology

Many vendors are actively developing new technologies to address the increasing market need for secure contactless technologies for a wide variety of applications. Changes in government regulations will also provide opportunities for enhancing contactless technology performance. It is important to note, however, that standards development is a lengthy process so it takes time for new technology developments to be reflected in standards that help to drive the availability of interoperable solutions. A few examples of new technologies that are expected include:

Changes to technology based on the ISO/IEC 15693 standard. Contactless cards supporting the ISO/IEC 15693 standard currently operate at 1.65 Kb/sec to meet FCC limits on sideband power in this frequency range. The FCC is expected to lift its restriction in late 2002, which would allow cards based on the ISO/IEC 15693 standard to improve their data rates.
Changes for higher speed operation. ISO working groups plan to add higher speed modes of operation to ISO/IEC 14443. This will increase the speed supported by this standard from 106 Kb/sec to the 848 Kb/sec that has already been demonstrated by IC manufacturers.
Alternative access control reader networking solutions. Wireless readers offer a significant advantage in lower costs of installation, particularly in older facilities. New security approaches can ensure strong authenticated channels between hosts or panels and new wireless readers. IP readers also permit direct connectivity to LANbased management and control applications.
The ability for a single contactless chip in a card to operate in full ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15693 modes.

Visa Competes with Payment Systems

Posted by :madrock.net On : March 24, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS

Tags:bank, Banking and EFTPoS, Card, Credit, development, Electronic, money, payment, RSA, Shiraz, transaction, VISA

27 September 2006
Kommersant International

The New System will be Offered to 20 Banks<br>Yesterday, at a press conference dedicated to the five-millionth visa card issued by Sberbank, Visa International representative Oliver Hughes announced that a project introducing a system of card-to-card money transfers in Russia has launched its third stage. The project, called Visa Money Transfer (VMT), is now being tested in six Russian banks. Also yesterday, Rosbank announced its intention to participate in the trial. Twenty credit organizations have expressed interest in joining the program, of which ten will be included in the project within the next year. The trial phase of the program will last another six months, after which the VMT system is expected to be unveiled in its full form. The VMT system allows any Visa cardholder to electronically transfer or receive funds to or from another Visa cardholder via an ATM transaction. To make the transaction, all that is needed is the other cardholder’s card number. Though the company “at this point is not positioning the new service as an alternative to the system of traditional money transfers,” VMT promises to be competition for that system. The only restriction is that the laws of the Russian Federation permit such transfers to be made in Russia only in rubles. Market analysts believe that the success of the system will depend on Visa’s commission policies. Bank commissions for transfers stand at around 1%, and if Visa’s commission is more than 0.5%, it is predicted that banks will find it hard to do business within the project. According to some sources, the commission earned by the bank whose client sends the transfer will be 1% of the transfer sum. The bank whose client receives the money will make $0.48 on each transaction. The commission charged by the payment system will be $0.05 + $1. Many Russian banks have expressed interest in the project, but most for now are observing the program’s development from the sidelines, preferring to judge for themselves its power to attract customers. http://www.kommersant.com/photo/75/DAILY/2006/180/KMO_032838_00111_1h_t75.jpg
http://www.kommersant.com/photo/512/DAILY/2006/180/KNN_001535_00046_1m.jpg
http://www.kommersant.com/photo/512/DAILY/2006/180/KMO_073625_00010_1m.jpg
http://www.kommersant.com/photo/512/DAILY/2006/180/KMO_069500_00019_1m.jpg

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What changes to contactless standards and technology are expected in the future?

Visa Competes with Payment Systems

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