Protection | madrock

How can users gain access to the SCADA application?
Objective to consolidate access to all information sources â€“ i.e. to make access available to all users via a single interface
Are any RAS modems utilised within the SCADA environment?
Is the RAS call back feature utilised?
Is the mandatory RAS encryption feature used?
Are users allowed multiple attempts at authentication on the RAS?
Has the RAS auditing feature been enabled?
How is access between the business / corporate network and SCADA network controlled?
How is the administrator password controlled?
How is vendor access to the SCADA network controlled â€“ i.e. password changes after contract has been completed?
Are SLAâ€™s for outsourced support agreements reviewed on a periodic basis?
Are critical components of the SCADA Network supported by a UPS and are these batteries tested on a regular basis to ensure that they are reliable?
What capacity management and monitoring of critical SCADA network systems is performed (i.e. CPU utilisation and hard disk drive space)?
Are legal captions utilised during the login process to the SCADA application and associated infrastructure / devices?
Has an intrusion detection system (IDS) been deployed within the SCADA environment?
Has security been a focus within the development and deployment of the SCADA network?
Is there additional staff screenings performed when staff are hired to work within the SCADA environment (inclusive of vendors etc)?

Policies & Procedures

Is there a defined security strategy for the SCADA environment?
Who is responsible / accountable for security management within SCADA environment? Has the ownership of this responsibility been clearly defined and/or stated in any documentation?
Are there any periodic security reviews of the SCADA network performed?
What procedures are in place to handle the disposal of SCADA network media and devices? Additionally, is there a process in place for the disposal of confidential information / documentation?
Are there any policies or procedures covering the introduction of new devices to the SCADA environment?
What formal change control procedures exist for the SCADA environment?
Does a formal disaster recovery plan exist for the SCADA environment?
Does a formal business continuity plan exist for the SCADA environment?
Do physical and logical security standards differ significantly between SCADA sites?
Has a standard operating environment (SOE) minimum baseline standard been developed for systems being introduced into the SCADA environment?
What security logs are maintained for critical computer equipment and how often are the logs reviewed?
Who is responsible for the reviewing of security logs?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
Upon commencement of employment, are users provided with IT security information as part of the induction process? Additionally, are users provided with further information on security issues on a periodic basis?
What procedures exist to monitor dial-in access?
Is there a formally defined backup and recovery procedure?
Are encryption techniques and/or passwords applied to backup tapes?

Physical Access

How is physical access to SCADA terminals controlled?
Are SCADA control rooms segregated from other rooms?
What building security exists at remote sites to prevent unauthorised access?
What authentication methods are used at remote sites to allow access â€“ i.e. swipe cards?
Are external windows at remotes sites barred?
What alarm systems have been employed at remote sites?

Network Security

Have all deployed routers been configured to ensure the filtering of communications that are unauthorised or not required?
What traffic control and monitoring capabilities have been deployed â€“ i.e. all communication travels to a central point before traversing further on the network.
How are dial-in facilities to the SCADA environment secured?
How is suspicious or unusual activity on the SCADA WAN detected?
What firewall configurations have been set up to segregate the SCADA WAN from the United Water corporate network?
Are all key filtering devices on the network (such as routers and firewalls) configured to log all attempts to access the network? If so are they reviewed on a regular basis?
Have the auditing features of all routers and firewalls been enabled?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
How is the management of patches / hot fixes controlled in regards to firewalls and routers?
What backup and recovery measures are in place for network resources â€“ firewalls and routers?
Has SNMP been implemented on core infrastructure?
Has any wireless equipment been deployed within the SCADA environment â€“ has this been configured to a secure state?
Are all default passwords removed from SCADA devices after implementation?
Does a development environment exist to test changes prior to deployment into the SCADA network production environment?

Workstation Security

What operating systems (version) are installed on SCADA terminals?
Have operating system level passwords been activated on all SCADA terminals?
Do passwords have an indefinite expiry date?
What file and directory permission controls have been implemented on SCADA terminals to restrict unauthorised access by general users?
What logs are generated at the operating system level?
Has access to event logs been restricted?
What tools and services at the operating system level have been restricted for general users?
Who is responsible for patch management of SCADA terminals?
Has an audit feature been enabled for all SCADA terminals?
Are default services available with the operating system restricted?
Is virus protection implemented? Is this software manually or automatically updated?
Are shares enabled on SCADA terminals / workstations?
Are SCADA terminals backed up on a regular basis?
Is registry auditing of SCADA terminals performed?
Are user reviews and associated access rights performed on a regular basis?

SCADA Application Security

What are the username and password requirements of SCADA application?
Are session time out features activated?
Are complex passwords enforced to access the SCADA application?
Are user reviews and associated access rights performed on a regular basis?

System Penetration Testing

Internal penetration testing
External penetration testing
Password strength tests

Changes to the SCADA network

Please provide / list all potential changes being considered to the SCADA network.

SCADA considerations

Posted by :Derek On : November 4, 2009

Category: SCADA

Tags:authentication, Corporate, data, encryption, environment, identification, Internet, mechanisms, network, password, Protection, SCADA, script, security, SMS, support, Vulnerabilities

Procedures

Corporate Information Protection
Security Management
Information Classification
Physical (and Environmental) Security
Personnel Security
Security Awareness Training
Security Incident Response
Security Monitoring
Network Security
PC/Workstation Security
Support and Operational Security Related
Encryption and Information Confidentiality
Authorization Controls
Identification and Authentication Mechanisms
Systems Life Cycle Security
Business Continuity Planning
Media Security
Third Party Services

Typical concerns and points discussion:

Inbound and out Bound FTP
Suggest use of DMZ
Suggest use of Secure FTP
Suggest use of restricted secure IP addresses / tunnelling
Suggest use of private feeds

Modem issues used with dial in services

No dial back
No Authentication
No Secure ID
Possibly automated scripts used, so hard coded usernames and passwords used.
Internet sharing may be turned on, allowing routing via workstations.

Increased data security and integrity considerations

Data backups
System redundancy
Site and content filtering
Virus protection
Standard system procurement (discounts and spares)
Network and services redundancy
Network monitoring
Service availability monitoring
Internal controls
Vendor / external service supplier
Capacity management
Change management system
Asset management system
Telecommunication and telephony bulk cost discounting
Etc.

Use and support for corporate application considerations

Email
Intranet
Internet
Corporate virus protection
Asset management
Change management
Project management
Performance / capacity management
Reduction of Cost
Use of corporate applications
Reduction of manual processes

Other things to keep in mind:

SCADA monitoring system must be isolated from network errors and systems events. This will prevent SCADA operational systems being effected by network or corporate system issues / outages.
Review Network topology to ensure internal and external vulnerabilities are not currently being and cannot be abused.
Review of router configurations
Use of change management system
Review remote dial in systems
Firewall SCADA systems off from corporate applications
Uncontrolled networks and systems within the SCADA environment will compromise the corporate environments integrity and security.
Determine if systems used within SCADA are built to a standard operating environment.

Amateur Radio and Radhaz

Posted by :Derek On : November 4, 2008

Something I have been very wary about for some year had begun to be better understood over the last few years.

I remember a doctor from an Adelaide hospital who presented at an IEEE meeting saying “on the record there hasn’t been enough research performed to prove that electromagnetic radiation causes cancer, but off the record I have seen enough cases where I am convinces it does”.

This simple statement and other examples provided during the presentation really drove home that we must be wary and respectful when using an existing near electromagnetic emitting devices.

This article came from the local South Australia Amature Radio Experimentes Group Website – Thanks for allthe great work. See link http://www.areg.org.au/info/radhaz/radhaz.html

General Background Information

The question of Radhaz has to be considered when you are constructing an Amateur Radio station that will operate near members of the general public as well as your self.

The responsibility for ensuring that the operation of an Amateur Radio transmitting station is operating with in the ARPANSA and ACMA guidelines is souly the responsibility of the amateur radio operator in control of the radio transmitter.

As the standard for Radiation Protection Standard for Maximum Exposure Levels to Radiofrequency Fields – 3 kHz to 300 GHz changes from time to time. The information on this web site will become out of date. AREG accepts no responsibility for the information presented on this page, the relative orginsations should be consolted for the latest up to date information.

For complete appraisal of your situation, you should consult one of the many orginsations that are NATA certified.

As of March 1st 2003, the Australian Communications & Media Authority (ACMA) introduced new limits for human exposure to electromagnetic radiation (EMR) covering all mobile transmitters such as remote controlled toys, walkie-talkies and hand held two-way radios as well as radio communications installations such as broadcast towers and amateur radio stations.

Under the new regulations, mandatory limits are set by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) and people who hold a licence for a radiocommunications facility will have to comply, and in certain cases, hold records demonstrating compliance with the limits.

For a complete details on the ARPANSA standard, please refer to the link below and the ARPANSA web site.

http://www.arpansa.gov.au

maximum-exposure-levels-to-radiofrequency-fields

The RPS No:3 Standard is known as, Radiation Protection Standard for Maximum Exposure Levels to Radiofrequency Fields â€” 3 kHz to 300 GHz (2002).

This Standard specifies limits of human exposure to radiofrequency (RF) fields in the frequency range 3 kHz to 300 GHz, to prevent adverse health effects. These limits are defined in terms of basic restrictions for exposure of all or a part of the human body. Relevant derived reference levels are also provided as a practical means of showing compliance with the basic restrictions. In particular, this Standard specifies the following:

(a) Basic restrictions for occupational exposure with corresponding derived reference levels as a function of frequency.

(b) Basic restrictions for general public exposure, with corresponding derived reference levels as a function of frequency.

(c) Equipment and usage parameters in order to assist in the determination of compliance with this Standard.
The limits specified in this Standard are intended to be used as a basis for planning work procedures, designing protective facilities, the assessment of the efficacy of protective measures and practices, and guidance on health surveillance

IDEAS page is all about putting up design and other general ideas. These may include part circuits or drawings of things that we have thought other people may be interested in. In general don’t expect a complete package, as this page is only meant to give you some ideas on what we have done. So you can further your own experimentation.

Financial Transaction Processing

Posted by :Derek On : July 2, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Infrastructure, Security

Tags:algorithm, architecture, Australia, bank, Banking and EFTPoS, BogoAtalla, Card, card verification, computations, Credit, CVV, data, Debit, debit card, debit cards, decrypt, decryption, decryption tools, DES, development, DUKPT, EFT, emulation, emulator, Eracom, financial transaction, hardware, hardware security, HSM, Linksys, Mall, mechanisms, payment, Pin, pin pad, processing, Protection, PVV, SAP, script, security, security architecture, server, Shiraz, simulation tools, SLA, SMS, technique, text, Thales, transaction, triple des, utility, Verification, VISA

I have been recently working inside one of the larger Banks in Australia.
Through this work, I have been looking at the controls and mechanisms surrounding the processing of credit and debit cards around the Asia Pacific.

I get to perform many security architecture and payment systems assessments.
Over the years I have always considered the protection of the card data as one of the key considerations.

Until yesterday I had never seen an CVV or PVV decryption tools. I think some scripted use of these tools could be very interesting.
The site hziggurat29.com

Many of the other tools on this site are also very unique and worth a look.
Big thanks to ziggurat29 for providing such awesome tools.

As many of these sites are of this nature are difficult to find and often seem to vanish over the years, I have chosen to replicate the the text from this page and provide local copies on the files.
It is worth periodically visiting the ziggurat29 site every now and again to see if any additional tools have been posted.

One of the more extraordinary files is the Atalla Hardware Security Module (HSM) and BogoAtalla for Linksys emulation (simulation) tools. So I wonder if Eracom and Thales are shaking in their boots. Some how I don’t think so. 😉

——– ziggurat29 Text ———

These are all Windows command-line utilities (except where noted); execute with the -help option
to determine usage.

DUKPT Decrypt (<- the actual file to download)

This is a utility that will decrypt Encrypted PIN Blocks that have been produced via the DUKPT triple-DES method. I used this for testing the output of some PIN Pad software I had created, but is also handy for other debugging purposes.

VISA PVV Calculator (<- the actual
file to download)

This is a utility that will compute and verify PIN Verification Values that have been produced using the VISA PVV technique. It has a bunch of auxiliary functions, such as verifying and fixing a PAN (Luhn computations), creating and encrypting PIN blocks, decrypting and extracting PINs from encrypted PIN blocks, etc.

VISA CVV Calculator (<- the actual file to download)

This is a utility that will compute Card Verification Values that have been produced using the VISA CVV technique. MasterCard CVC uses the CVV algorithm, so it will work for that as well. It will compute CVV, CVV2, CVV3, iCVV, CAVV, since these are just variations on service code and the
format of the expiration date. Verification is simply comparing the computed value with what you have received, so there is no explicit verification function.

Atalla AKB Calculator (<- the actual file to download)

This is a utility that will both generate and decrypt Atalla AKB cryptograms. You will need the plaintext MFK to perform these operations. When decrypting, the MAC will also be checked and the results shown.

BogoAtalla (<- the actual file to
download)

This is an Atalla emulator (or simulator). This software emulation (simulation) of the well-known Atalla Hardware Security Module (HSM) that is used by banks and processors for cryptographic operations, such as verifying/translating PIN blocks, authorising transactions by verifying
CVV/CSC numbers, and performing key exchange procedures, was produced for testing purposes. This implementation is not of the complete HP Atalla command set, but rather the just
portions that I myself needed. That being said, it is complete enough if you are performing acquiring and/or issuing processing functions, and are using more modern schemes such as Visa PVV and DUKPT, and need to do generation, verification, and translation.

This runs as a listening socket server and handles the native Atalla command set. I have taken some liberties with the error return values and have not striven for high-fidelity there (i.e., you may get a different error response from native hardware), but definitely should get identical positive
responses. Some features implemented here would normally require purchasing premium commands, but all commands here implemented are available. Examples are generating PVV values and encrypting/decrypting plaintext PIN values.

BogoAtalla for Linksys (<- the actual file to download)

This is the Atalla emulator ported to Linux and build for installation on an OpenWRT system. Makes for a really cheap ($60 USD) development/test device.

Local Files

bogoatalla002
atallaakbcalc
bogoatalla_10-1_mipsel
dukptdecrypt
visacvvcalc
visapvvcalc

E-Commerce Glossary

Posted by :Derek On : June 18, 2008

Category: Banking & EFTPoS, Security

Tags:access, account, acquirer, Australia, authenticate, bank, Banking, Banking and EFTPoS, bar, Card, card verification, Commerce, common gateway interface, Corporate, Credit, data, Debit, DES, Digital, Dust, EFT, Electronic, encryption, Explorer, financial institution, financial transaction, IEC, integration, interface, Internet, ISP, Mall, Merchant, Microsoft, money, network, online, password, payment, payment gateways, Pin, privacy, processing, Protection, reporting, script, security, server, Shiraz, SLA, something, support, Telstra, text, transaction, transmission, type, Verification, verification data, VISA, web

Acquiring Institution
The Financial Institution which holds the Merchant Account partaking in a financial transaction, typically the first bank involved in the processing of a payment.

Applet
A small computer program which facilitates the performance of particular tasks.

Bandwidth
The capacity of a server to carry or process information. The higher the bandwidth the faster graphics-laden web pages will download.

Browser
Short for Web browser, a software application used to locate and display Web pages. The two most popular browsers are Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer. Both of these are graphical browsers, which means that they can display graphics as well as text. In addition, most modern browsers can present multimedia information, including sound and video, though they require plug-ins for some formats.

Caching
The automatic copying and storage of frequently used information onto a computer system “ Typically caching is seen whilst surfing the internet (graphics, etc.) and used by Internet Services Providers (ISP’s) to reduce the amount of data requested from the user onto the internet.

Issuer
The Financial Institution which issued the cardholder’s account and card.

Cardholder
The individual participating in the financial transaction whose card is being credited or debited.

Card Verification Data
The additional information printed on the card to be processed. This is used to verify if the card was present when the transaction was initiated.Â This is the additional digits imprinted on the card usually on the reverse side for VISA & Mastercard and on the front for AMEX.

Certificate
An x.509 certificate used to authenticate entities such as Merchants and Payment Gateways. Certificates can be used to identify and/or encrypt sensitive data such as card numbers and personal cardholder information.

CGI
Common Gateway Interface: A protocol that allows a Web page to run a program on a Web server. Forms, counters, and guest books are common examples of CGI programs.

Any piece of software can be a CGI program if it handles input and output according to the CGI standard. Usually a CGI program is a small program that takes data from a web server and does something with it, like putting the content of a form into an e-mail message, or turning the data into a database query. CGI “scripts” are just scripts which use CGI. CGI is often confused with Perl, which is a programming language, while CGI is an interface to the server from a particular program.

Client
A computer or software that requests a service of another computer system or process (a “server”). For example, a workstation requesting the contents of a file from a file server is a client of the file server. A web browser is commonly referred to as a client.

Clients and Servers
In general, all of the machines on the Internet can be categorised as two types: servers and clients. Those machines that provide services (like Web servers or FTP servers) to other machines are servers. And the machines that are used to connect to those services are clients.

When you connect to Yahoo at www.google.com to read a page, Google is providing a machine (probably a cluster of very large machines), for use on the Internet, to service your request. Google is providing a server. Your machine, on the other hand, is probably providing no services to anyone else on the Internet. Therefore, it is a user machine, also known as a client. It is possible and common for a machine to be both a server and a client !

Cookie
A file sent by some web servers to your computer’s hard drive to enable you to quickly and easily return to particular sites. Cookies give rise to privacy concerns as they are often used to store information used for marketing purposes.

The main purpose of cookies is to identify users and possibly prepare customised Web pages for them. When you enter a Web site using cookies, you may be asked to fill out a form providing such information as your name and interests. This information is packaged into a cookie and sent to your Web browser which stores it for later use. The next time you go to the same Web site, your browser will send the cookie to the Web server. The server can use this information to present you with custom Web pages. So, for example, instead of seeing just a generic welcome page you might see a welcome page with your name on it.

CRN
The Customer Receipt Number (CRN) is used to assist the card holder, the payment gateway and the transaction acquirer to confirm the transaction has been processed and to track the transaction throughout the end-to-end transaction process. This is often used when making enquiries about a transaction or for transaction tracking.

Cybersquatting
Bad faith, abusive domain name registration. Cybersquatters register company and product names as domain names with a view to selling them at inflated prices to the rightful owners.

CVC
The additional information printed on the card to be processed. This is used to verify if the card was present when the transaction was initiated. This is the additional digits imprinted on the card usually on the reverse side for VISA & Mastercard and on the front for AMEX.

Database
A collection of data: part numbers, product codes, customer information, etc. It usually refers to data organised and stored on a computer that can be searched and retrieved by a computer program.

Deep link
A hypertext link directly to a web page, often bypassing home pages or other identifying pages.

Digital Certificate
A pop up window that allows you to identify the level of encryption used to secure a particular web site.

Digital Signature
A complex numeric “signature” designed to be used, in conjunction with special software, to authenticate the sender of a message and guarantee that the contents of the message have not been altered during transmission to the recipient. The EU has adopted legislation which makes electronic signatures legally valid. The Electronic Transaction Bill (Cth) 1999 has the same effect in Australia.

Domain Name
The plain English name given to a host destination on the Internet, for example, www.madrock.net. The suffix, dot.com is known as the generic top level domain, the prefix madrock. The domain name forms part of the Internet Address or URL.

A name that identifies one or more IP addresses. For example, the domain name microsoft.com represents about a dozen IP addresses. Domain names are used in URLs to identify particular Web pages. For example, in the URL http://www.madrock.net, the domain name is madrock.net.

Download
To transfer information from one computer to your computer.

Dynamic web page
A web document that is created from a database in real-time or “on the fly” at the same time it is being viewed, providing a continuous flow of new information and giving visitors a new experience each time they visit the web site.

Dynamic web sites offer the user the ability to interact with the web site. This interaction can take place in the form of a search for products, a questionnaire that automatically posts results or online polls. Basically, dynamic web pages and content are generated from the input of the user.

EC
Electronic Commerce.

Often referred to as simply e-commerce, business that is conducted over the Internet using any of the applications that rely on the Internet, such as e-mail, instant messaging, shopping carts, Web services, and FTP, among others. Electronic commerce can be between two businesses transmitting funds, goods, services and/or data or between a business and a customer.

ECI
The Electronic Commerce Indicator (ECI), is used to determine the source of the original transaction request. This is a program that the banks have developed and have mandated itâ€™s use.

Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Systems set up by businesses, which facilitate the electronic exchange of information.

Encryption
The process of scrambling data to prevent it being viewed by unauthorized persons.

Expiry Date
The date printed on the card indicating when the card will expire. Not to be confused with the card issue date found on some cards.

Firewall
An electronic security barrier and/or traffic filter.

Forms
Forms are web pages comprised of text and “fields” for a user to fill in with information. They are an excellent way of collecting and processing information from people visiting a web site, as well as allowing them to interact with web pages. Forms are written in HTML and processed by CGI programs.

Frame
A means of dividing a web screen into a number of compartments. Frames may give rise to legal disputes if web sites created by third parties are framed as your own.

FTP servers
One of the oldest of the Internet services, File Transfer Protocol makes it possible to move one or more files securely between computers while providing file security and organisation as well as transfer control.

Fulfilment
1. Process of supplying goods after an order has been received.
2. Process of reacting to a customer’s request, covering everything that has to happen from the time the customer places an order until they are completely satisfied.

Host
Any computer on a network that provides services or information to other computers on the network. A host is also called a server.

Integration
The software and/or business processes which combine the Merchant’s (website, back office, etc.) order processing system with the EFT Network Electronic Payment System.

IP address
Every computer connected to the Internet is assigned a unique number known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address. Since these numbers are usually assigned in country-based blocks, an IP address can often be used to identify the country from which a computer is connecting to the Internet.

Gateway
A system allowing incompatible computer networks to send and receive information.

HTML (Hypertext Markup Language)
Language used to translate text documents into a form which can be sent over the web.

Hyperlink
A highlighted phrase in a document which permits linking to another document or part of a document.

Internet Content Host (ICH)
Those who host or propose to host content on the Internet. Anybody who is responsible for a web site, news group or bulletin board that contains articles, graphics or other internet content provided by others. The host may/may not also produce their own content and/or provide access to the Internet through a carriage service, ie they may also be an ISP.

Internet Service Provider (ISP)
A company that provides an Internet connection through some kind of Internet carriage service, for example Sprint, Chello Broadband, Telstra Bigpond, Adam Internet, Internode. ISP’s may/may not also be ICHs.

Mail servers
Almost as ubiquitous and crucial as Web servers, mail servers move and store mail over corporate networks (via LANs and WANs) and across the Internet.

Merchant account
This is an account set up with a bank to process credit card orders from customers.

Merchant
The entity receiving payments for goods and/or services.

Merchant Account
The merchant’s account into which transactions are credited or debited.

Merchant Server
The software installed on the Merchant’s web sites or back office system to enable real-time or batched processing of financial transactions.

Merchant Server Administrator
The individual(s) responsible for the maintenance of the Merchant Server, including issuing and importing merchant certificates.

MTL
Merchant Transaction Layer (MTL)

PAN
Primary Account Number (PAN) is the number printed on the customers card to reference the cardholder’s financial account. This is typically the card number.

Payment Gateway
The Payment Gateway provides a central point of contact/transaction switching with the banking network for the Merchant Server software or devices. The EFT Networks Payment gateway provides advanced integrated reporting, merchant integration services (Mainframe, Mini, Windows, UNIX, OS400, Desktop/Server, EFT PoS Terminals. Loyalty systems, etc.) and Merchant/Bank customised solutions not offered by regional or global banking institutions.

An online system for real-time charging of credit cards when a customer places an order. Normally requires a merchant account.

A common question from merchants is “Do we have to change banks to use payment gateways?”

The answer is NO!Â – All you need to do is open a merchant facility with one of the supported banks, EFT Networks can ensure you open the correct one for your transaction needs. The merchant facility is then linked to a nominated bank account for example: Bank of New Zealand, ANZ, St George Bank, NAB, Commonwealth, Westpac, Bank of America, Bank of Scotland, Barclay’s, Bank of Queensland, etc. The money is then transferred at the end of each day from your merchant account to your nominated account.

“Pretty Good Privacy”
A type of encryption program used to scramble data.

Portal
A site that gathers together many sites under a common branding, for example, Yahoo and Excite.

Private key
The password which permits information to be decoded in a public key encryption system.

Public key
The password which is used to send a secure message in a public key encryption system.

Secure Certificate
A document that is used to certify that a user or organisation is who they say they are. They contain information about who it belongs to, who it was issued by, expiry date and information that can be used to check out the contents of the certificate. It is as an important part of the SSL system for establishing secure connections.

Server
A computer that provides a service to other computers (known as clients) on a network.

Shopping cart
A shopping cart is a piece of software that acts as an online store’s catalogue and ordering process. Typically, a shopping cart is the interface between a company’s Web site and its deeper infrastructure, allowing consumers to select merchandise; review what they have selected; make necessary modifications or additions; and purchase the merchandise.

Shopping carts can be sold as independent pieces of software so companies can integrate them into their own unique online solution, or they can be offered as a feature from a service that will create and host a company’s e-commerce site.

Spam
The use of email or newsgroups to send unsolicited information.

SSL
Short for Secure Sockets Layer, a protocol developed by Netscape for transmitting private documents via the Internet. SSL works by using a private key to encrypt data that’s transferred over the SSL connection. Both Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer support SSL, and many Web sites use the protocol to obtain confidential user information, such as credit card numbers. By convention, URLs that require an SSL connection start with https: instead of http:.

Letting your customers know that you have SSL protection gives your site credibility and may encourage customers to deal with you in confidence.

A security protocol used to protect information – typically used between the cardholder’s web browser and the merchant’s webserver and throughout the transaction processing process. 128bit SSL is typical used as a minimum level within the Payment & Financial industries.

A Secure Server uses an SSL certificate. It is generally a piece of web space that can only be dealt with by using SSL ensuring that data transferred between the web space and the browser is encrypted.

Static web page
In web site terms, static means web pages that are not interactive. Because the web site visitor does not have any control over the information provided, the pages and information do not change with each visit. There is not a two-way communication between the user (client) and the web site (server) in a static page.

Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
An Internet address.

Web page
A specific group of related files on the web, which is usually viewed as a single document.

Web servers
At its core, a Web server serves static content to a Web browser by loading a file from a hard disk and serving it across the network to a user’s Web browser. This entire exchange is mediated by the browser and server talking to each other using HTTP.

Web site
A collection of web pages stored on a file server.

Lethal Toxins Entering Your Body

Posted by :Derek On : May 4, 2008

Category: Environment & People, Food & Wine

Tags:Australia, Australian, DES, development, environment, Environment & People, ISP, Kerry, Mall, Material, Pin, Protection, pvc, Restaurant, Shiraz, text, toxins

I recently read an article in a magazine and was shocked to see some of the toxic dangers which modern living introduce. Australian Men’s Health April 2008, by Susan Casey, pg 87.

I thought I would expand on this article here as a method of analysing some of the things Kerry and I need to be careful of. I hope this also assists others in understanding some of these dangers.

“Except for the small amount that’s been incinerated every bit of plastic ever manufactured still exists”

Toxic Articles	Polycarbonate Bottles (marked with a #7 in a triangle)	Cling wrap and plastic takeaway containers (marked with a #7)
Dangerous Ingredients	Bisphenol A (BPA), a synthetic oestrogen, which can leach into the bottle’s contents when heated.span>	Phthalates, a probable human carcinogen and endocrine disruptor, can seep into food (especially fatty foods, such as delis meats and cheeses).
Linked to	Prostate cancer, reduced sperm count and reproductive-organ abnormalities, according to US studies at the universities of Missouri, Chicago and Cincinnati.	Reproductive problems like undescended testes and low sperm count, reveal researchers at New York’s University of Rochester and the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in the US.
How to reduce your exposure	Pots, pans and bottles made from stainless steel are a non-toxic alternative. If you’re using polycarbonate, keep it out of the dishwasher and replace it every 60 days or if it’s scratched. Plastic releases toxins over tie when damaged or exposed to high heat.	Keep it out of microwave and dishwasher. Don’t store fatty or acidic foods in these containers, rather use waxed paper and buy meat wrapped in paper from the butcher. If you use plastic-wrapped cuts, trim the edges off where the product touched the wrapping.

Toxic Articles	Polystyrene cups and takeaway containers (marked with a #6)	Fast-food containers (with waxy lining) and non-stick (Teflon) pans.	Polyvinyl chloride (PVC), used in vinyl flooring, shower curtains and car interiors.
Dangerous Ingredients	Styrene, a possible human carcinogen, can leah into the contents of the cup.	Perfluoro-octanoic acid (PFOA), a grease-repelling flourotelomer chemical and likely human carcinogen, can transfer from the waxy-plastic coating onto the food inside, especially at high temperatures.	Vinyl chloride is a known human carcinogen that gives off gas into the surrounding air, so it’s inhaled instead of ingested.span>
Linked to	Cancer, warn scientists at the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Research and Development and the World Health Organisations International Agency for Research on Cancer.	Cancer, lung and kidney damage, according to studies at the EPA and Environmental Working Group in the US.	Cancer and liver damage, predicts both the EA and the Centre for Health and Environmental Justice in the US.
How to reduce your exposure	Never drink hot liquids out of polystyrene ups. Use paper ones (those without a wax lining) whenever possible or a ceramic coffee mug. If your takeaway comes in polystyrene, transfer it to ceramic dish or glass as soon as possible.	The best alternatives to drive-through and delivery are sit-down restaurants and home cooking. At home, never use Teflon-coated pans. If you own any, replace with non-toxic cookware made from copper, cast iron or stainless steel.	Use natural materials for home flooring. Buy a shower curtain made from hemp, which lasts longer and is naturally mildew-resistant. New vinyl gives off aerial toxins at highly concentrated levels, so open windows to air spaces where this material is present.

These are also great articles:

http://www.seattlepi.com/local/326907_plastic09.html

http://www.bravenewleaf.com/environment/2008/02/updated-repeat.html

http://www.breastcancerfund.org/clear-science/environmental-breast-cancer-links/plastics/

http://io9.com/how-to-recognize-the-plastics-that-are-hazardous-to-you-461587850

http://www.smallfootprintfamily.com/avoiding-toxins-in-plastic

http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/04/11/plastic-use.aspx

Serious flaws in bluetooth security lead to disclosure of personal data

Posted by :madrock.net On : March 24, 2008

Category: Bluetooth, Security

Tags:access, ASP, attack, authenticate, authentication, Backdoor, bar, bluejacker, Bluejacking, Bluetooth, broadcast, Card, Communications, Corporate, Credit, data, DES, Digital, EFT, environment, Ericsson, hack, Hacking, handshake, identity, integration, interface, Internet, ISP, JAVA, javascript, Mall, mechanisms, mobile phones, network, online, patch, phone, Pin, Protection, RSA, script, security, Serious, Shiraz, Siemens, SLA, SMS, SNARF, something, Technical, technique, technology, text, Vulnerabilities, vulnerability, Vulnerable

source

Summary
In November 2003, Adam Laurie of A.L. Digital Ltd. discovered that there are serious flaws in the authentication and/or data transfer mechanisms on some bluetooth enabled devices. Specifically, three vulnerabilities have been found:

Firstly, confidential data can be obtained, anonymously, and without the owner’s knowledge or consent, from some bluetooth enabled mobile phones. This data includes, at least, the entire phone book and calendar, and the phone’s IMEI.

Secondly, it has been found that the complete memory contents of some mobile phones can be accessed by a previously trusted (“paired”) device that has since been removed from the trusted list. This data includes not only the phonebook and calendar, but media files such as pictures and text messages. In essence, the entire device can be “backed up” to an attacker’s own system.

Thirdly, access can be gained to the AT command set of the device, giving full access to the higher level commands and channels, such as data, voice and messaging. This third vulnerability was identified by Martin Herfurt, and they have since started working together on finding additional possible exploits resulting from this vulnerability.

Finally, the current trend for “Bluejacking” is promoting an environment which puts consumer devices at greater risk from the above attacks.
Vulnerabilities

The SNARF attack:
It is possible, on some makes of device, to connect to the device without alerting the owner of the target device of the request, and gain access to restricted portions of the stored data therein, including the entire phonebook (and any images or other data associated with the entries), calendar, real-time clock, business card, properties, change log, IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity [6], which uniquely identifies the phone to the mobile network, and is used in illegal phone ‘cloning’). This is normally only possible if the device is in “discoverable” or “visible” mode, but there are tools available on the Internet that allow even this safety net to be bypassed[4]. Further details will not be released at this time (see below for more on this), but the attack can and will be demonstrated to manufacturers and press if required.

The BACKDOOR attack:
The backdoor attack involves establishing a trust relationship through the “pairing” mechanism, but ensuring that it no longer appears in the target’s register of paired devices. In this way, unless the owner is actually observing their device at the precise moment a connection is established, they are unlikely to notice anything untoward, and the attacker may be free to continue to use any resource that a trusted relationship with that device grants access to (but note that so far we have only tested file transfers). This means that not only can data be retrieved from the phone, but other services, such as modems or Internet, WAP and GPRS gateways may be accessed without the owner’s knowledge or consent. Indications are that once the backdoor is installed, the above SNARF attack will function on devices that previously denied access, and without the restrictions of a plain SNARF attack, so we strongly suspect that the other services will prove to be available also.

The BLUEBUG attack:
The bluebug attack creates a serial profile connection to the device, thereby giving full access to the AT command set, which can then be exploited using standard off the shelf tools, such as PPP for networking and gnokii for messaging, contact management, diverts and initiating calls. With this facility, it is possible to use the phone to initiate calls to premium rate numbers, send sms messages, read sms messages, connect to data services such as the Internet, and even monitor conversations in the vicinity of the phone. This latter is done via a voice call over the GSM network, so the listening post can be anywhere in the world. Bluetooth access is only required for a few seconds in order to set up the call. Call forwarding diverts can be set up, allowing the owner’s incoming calls to be intercepted, either to provide a channel for calls to more expensive destinations, or for identity theft by impersonation of the victim.

Bluejacking:
Although known to the technical community and early adopters for some time, the process now known as “Bluejacking”[1] has recently come to the fore in the consumer arena, and is becoming a popular mechanism for exchanging anonymous messages in public places. The technique involves abusing the bluetooth “pairing”[2] protocol, the system by which bluetooth devices authenticate each other, to pass a message during the initial “handshake” phase. This is possible because the “name” of the initiating bluetooth device is displayed on the target device as part of the handshake exchange, and, as the protocal allows a large user defined name field – up to 248 characters – the field itself can be used to pass the message. This is all well and good, and, on the face of it, fairly harmless, but, unfortunately, there is a down side. There is a potential security problem with this, and the more the practice grows and is accepted by the user community, and leveraged as a marketing tool by the vendors, the worse it will get. The problem lies in the fact that the protocol being abused is designed for information exchange. The ability to interface with other devices and exchange, update and synchronise data, is the raison d’Ãªtre of bluetooth. The bluejacking technique is using the first part of a process that allows that exchange to take place, and is therefore open to further abuse if the handshake completes and the “bluejacker” successfully pairs with the target device. If such an event occurs, then all data on the target device becomes available to the initiator, including such things as phone books, calendars, pictures and text messages. As the current wave of PDA and telephony integration progresses, the volume and quality of such data will increase with the devices’ capabilities, leading to far more serious potential compromise. Given the furore that irrupted when a second-hand Blackberry PDA was sold without the previous owner’s data having been wiped[3], it is alarming to think of the consequences of a single bluejacker gathering an entire corporate staff’s contact details by simply attending a conference or camping outside their building or in their foyer with a bluetooth capable device and evil intent. Of course, corporates are not the only potential targets – a bluejacking expedition to, say, The House of Commons, or The US Senate, could provide some interesting, valuable and, who’s to say, potentially damaging or compromising data.<<<

The above may sound alarmist and far fetched, and the general reaction would probably be that most users would not be duped into allowing the connection to complete, so the risk is small. However, in today’s society of instant messaging, the average consumer is under a constant barrage of unsolicited messages in one form or another, whether it be by SPAM email, or “You have won!” style SMS text messages, and do not tend to treat them with much suspicion (although they may well be sceptical about the veracity of the offers). Another message popping up on their ‘phone saying something along the lines of “You have won 10,000 pounds! Enter this 4 digit PIN number and then dial 0900-SUCKER to collect your prize!” is unlikely to cause much alarm, and is more than likely to succeed in many cases.

Workarounds and fixes
We are not aware of any workarounds for the SNARF or BLUEBUG attacks at this time, other than to switch off bluetooth. For permanent fixes, see the ‘Fixes’ section at the bottom of the page.

To permanently remove a pairing, and protect against future BACKDOOR attacks, it seems you must perform a factory reset, but this will, of course, erase all your personal data.

To avoid Bluejacking, “just say no”.

The above methods work to the best of our knowledge, but, as the devices affected are running closed-source proprietary software, it not possible to verify that without the collaboration of the manufacturers. We therefore make no claims as to the level of protection they provide, and you must continue to use bluetooth at your own risk.

Who’s Vulnerable
To date the quantity of devices tested is not great. However, due to the fact that they are amongst the most popular brands, we still consider the affected group to be large. It is also assumed that there are shared implementations of the bluetooth stack, so what affects one model is likely to affect others. This table is accurate to the best of our knowledge, but without the cooperation of the manufacturers (which we currently do not have), it is not possible to conduct more extensive validation.

The devices known to be vulnerable at this time are:

Vulnerability Matrix ( = NOT Vulnerable)*
Make	Model	Firmware Rev	BACKDOOR	SNARF when Visible	SNARF when NOT Visible	BUG
Ericsson	T68	20R1B 20R2A013 20R2B013 20R2F004 20R5C001	?	Yes	No	No
Sony Ericsson	R520m	20R2G	?	Yes	No	?
Sony Ericsson	T68i	20R1B 20R2A013 20R2B013 20R2F004 20R5C001	?	Yes	?	?
Sony Ericsson	T610	20R1A081 20R1L013 20R3C002 20R4C003 20R4D001	?	Yes	No	?
Sony Ericsson	T610	20R1A081	?	?	?	Yes
Sony Ericsson	Z1010	?	?	Yes	?	?
Sony Ericsson	Z600	20R2C007 20R2F002 20R5B001	?	Yes	?	?
Nokia	6310	04.10 04.20 4.07 4.80 5.22 5.50	?	Yes	Yes	?
Nokia	6310i	4.06 4.07 4.80 5.10 5.22 5.50 5.51	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nokia	7650	?	Yes	No (+)	?	No
Nokia	8910	?	?	Yes	Yes	?
Nokia	8910i	?	?	Yes	Yes	?
* Siemens	S55	?	No	No	No	No
* Siemens	SX1	?	No	No	No	No
Motorola	V600 (++)	?	No	No	No	Yes
Motorola	V80 (++)	?	No	No	No	Yes

+ We now believe the 7650 is only vulnerable to SNARF if it has already been BACKDOORed.
++ The V600 and V80 are discoverable for only 60 seconds, when first powered on or when this feature is user selected, and the window for BDADDR discovery is therefore very small. Motorola have stated that they will correct the vulnerability in current firmware.

Disclosure
What is the Philosophy of Full Disclosure, and why are we providing the tools and detailing the methods that allow this to be done? The reasoning is simple – by exposing the problem we are achieving two goals: firstly, to alert users that the dangers exist, in order that they can take their own precautions against compromise, and secondly, to put pressure on manufacturers to rectify the situation. Consumers have a right to expect that their confidential data is treated as such, and is not subject to simple compromise by poorly implemented protocols on consumer devices. Manufacturers have a duty of care to ensure that such protection is provided, but, in practice, commercial considerations will often take precedence, and, given the choice, they may choose to simply supress or hide the problem, or, even worse, push for laws that prevent the discovery and/or disclosure of such flaws[5]. In our humble opinion, laws provide scant consumer protection against the lawless.

After 13 months, and in consideration of the fact that affected manufacturers had acknowledged the issues and made updated firmware available, Full Disclosure took place at the Chaos Computer Club’s annual congress – 21C3, in Berlin, 2004.

Slides from the disclosure talk can be found here: http://trifinite.org/Downloads/21c3_Bluetooth_Hacking.pdf

Tools
Proof of concept utilities have been developed, but are not yet available in the wild. They are:

bluestumbler – Monitor and log all visible bluetooth devices (name, MAC, signal strength, capabilities), and identify manufacturer from MAC address lookup.
bluebrowse – Display available services on a selected device (FAX, Voice, OBEX etc).
bluejack – Send anoymous message to a target device (and optionally broadcast to all visible devices).
bluesnarf – Copy data from target device (everything if pairing succeeds, or a subset in other cases, including phonebook and calendar. In the latter case, user will not be alerted by any bluejack message).
bluebug – Set up covert serial channel to device.
Tools will not be released at this time, so please do not ask. However, if you are a bona-fide manufacturer of bluetooth devices that we have been otherwise unable to contact, please feel free to get in touch for more details on how you can identify your device status.

Credits
The above vulnerabilities were discovered by Adam Laurie, during the course of his work with A.L. Digital, in November 2003, and this announcement was prepared thereafter by Adam and Ben Laurie for immediate release.

Adam Laurie is Managing Director and Chief Security Officer of A.L. Digital Ltd.

Ben Laurie is Technical Director of A.L. Digital, and author of Apache-SSL and contributor to many other open source projects, too numerous to expand on here.

A.L. Digital Ltd. are the owner operators of The Bunker, the world’s most secure data centre(s).
e: adam@algroup.co.uk
w: http://www.aldigital.co.uk

e: ben@algroup.co.uk
w: http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html

Further information relating to this disclosure will be updated at http://www.bluestumbler.org

References:
[1]

[2]

http://www.palowireless.com/infotooth/tutorial/lmp.asp

[3]

www.outlaw.com

[4]

bluesniff
btscanner
redfang

[5]

http://www.eff.org/

[6]

http://www.babt.com/gsm-imei-number-allocation.asp
http://www.mobiledia.com/glossary/68.html
- The Bluetooth SIG.
- Bruce Potter’s Defcon-11 presentation [Powerpoint].
- @Stake’s Bluetooth Discovery Paper [PDF].
- Marcel Holtmann’s German papers.
- Marcel Holtmann’s other papers.
- Bluetooth Device Security Database.
- Martin Herfurt’s CeBIT snarfing expedition.
- Slides from Blackhat/DEFCON talk.
- Nokia releases patches.

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